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INTRODUCTION 
In making this study of the Dovmward Trend of Argentine 
II 
' 
I 
I 
II 
~ I 
I 
I' 
I; 
II 
il 
I'' 
li 
,, 
ii Agricultural Production and Exports, 1946-51, the author has 
II 
II 
I! 
II 
I' 
I 
downward trend. 111 
in Argentina, at·, 
I[ 
attempted to analyze the causes underlying the 
in the production and exports of Farn products 
,[ 
!,'1 a time when this trend should have been up~1ard, In order to j, 
li 
show this dmv.nward trend, he has used information and statistic$ 
of the united states and Argentine Governments, the United 11 
Nations and the Pan American Union. It is the author's con-
sidered opinion, as evidenced by the facts and figures support-'; 
ing his viewpoint, that the overwhelming reason for this 
downward trend is the policy of the Argentine Government 
·, 
'I I, 
1: (which · 
controls exports of farm products) in utilizing the profits 
earned by its sales of agricultural products on the inter-
national market for the benefit of the industrial sector of the I 
! 
, Argentine economy (in the political wooing of labor and capital)~ 
[ i! 
at the expense of the agricultural economy, which has received Jl 
almost no recompense above the bare cost of production of its II 
il 
crops. As a result of this official policy of no reward, 
1
1 Argentine farmers have voluntarily cut down the area sovm to 
I 
lbasic crops, in obvious retaliation to the Government's policy. 
I, 
This general reduction in the area under crops has resulted in 
the inevitable downward trend in the production and exports of 
agricultural commodities, 
il 
'I 
I 
I 
.I 
~~ 
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In order to bolster this assertion, the author has 
utilized Table VIII 9see page 82), in which may be noted the 
downward trend in the areas planted to basic grains in the 
post-war years, and the nmch larger areas sovm in pre-war 
years. The crop in exports of the leading crops from 
1946-51 may be observed in Table VII (see page 80). Finally, 
Table XII1: (see page 101), a comparison of the pre-war exports 
(1935-39) of agricultural commodities with those pertaining 
during 1946-51, will show the obvious downward trend. 
It is not the author's purpose merely to point out the 
obvious fallacy in ae,Ticultural policy of the Argentine· 
/_,/ 
Government; Argentina, richly endowed with many varieties of 
natural resources, blessed with geographical advantages, 
having a basically European population possessing industrial 
and technological "know-how" has the tools to develop into 
a world power, raising the living standards of the Argentine 
people at the same time it contributes to the common _good of 
the family of nations. It is the author's purpose to point 
out that this bright hope for. the future of Argentina can come :: 
'I 
:I to pass only if those who guide the country politics lly espouse jl 
I I those policies, with regard to the agricultural economy, which 
II may best set the course to such a future. 
,I 
ij 
I! 
jl 
i 
I 
II 
·· .. c~--4 
II jl 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGRO!JND OF ARGENTINA AS PRODUCER AND 
EXPORTER OF AGRICULTURAL cmn,!ODITIES 
Argentina lies in the lower portion of South America 
with Chile, from which it is separated by a 2,500 mile-long 
boundary that follows the Andes Mountains. It is located in 
the Southern Hemisphere on a line due south of New England 
but east of most of the United States. It is bordered by 
, Bolivia and Paraguay on the north; by Brazil, uruguay, and 
the Atlantic Ocean on the east; and by Chile on the west. 
If a map of the continent of South America is placed 
upon a map of North America so as to keep latitudes in correct 
position, but without regard to exact positions of the 
meridians, Argentina would extend from CUba to I~dson Bay. 
However, the temperatures does not drop as law in southern 
i; ij FUego, and its coastline, which faces the southern Atlantic, 
II is more than 1,500 miles in length. Reaching so far north 
I' 
'I I, and south, the country has a variety of climates, but the 
=-~~~--~+- . -----~-----· -------------- - - ~· -- --------- --- -
-2-
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greater part of it is in the Temperate Zone. 
1 
Argentina has an area of approximately 1,080,000 
square miles. It is equivalent in size to the portion of the 
United States lying east of the Mississippi River plus Texas. 
Between 1929-19451 the United States' yearly average total 
ac~eage was 360 million acres among its 52 principal crops, 
in comparison with Argentina's total average acreage of 67 
million acres annually during this same periodl Argentina's 
1 
planted 
that of 
acreage, therefore, 
2 
the United States. 
is about one-fifth as large as 
strategic location~ dominant position in world 
grain trade. Except in Argentina, the topography of South 
America does not favor foreign trading. The Andes form a 
barrier along the Pacific coast and along much of the con-
tinent's caribbean coast. Brazil's Atlantic coast likewise 
:1 is chiefly mountainous. In Argentina, however, there is no 
barrier between the highly productive farming regions and 
the sea, and so there is an extensive rail and highway net-
:: work running inland from the Argentine ports. In the united 
·I 
il states, the maize and hog belt is located far in the interior, 
,, 
:: and exports from it require a long and expensive haul. The 
,. 
II grain and livestock area in Argentina, however, is located 
1
1 
near the ports where trans-Atlantic steamers call. only a 
i short haul by rail or truck is required, and the level 
I 
I topography of the zone has facilitated the construction of 
II railroads and highways and has lowered transportation costs. 
I' ,,,,,-,-,,--,-~ ,,_ "-,-~,---,--~ =--- --,,-- -~n- --- -~ _,,,-=,- , ,~,---=~- " 
i 
•' 
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Because of the location of the South American continent, 
Argentina is far from the principal world markets, which are 
located in the Northern Hemisphere. The distance by sea from 
Buenos Aires to southampton, England, is 61 250 miles and 
from Buenos Aires to New York, 51 930 miles. Nevertheless, 
oceanic shipping is relatively cheap, amd Argentina is favored 
by the proximity of its farm lands to ports. The chief ports 
are linked with the Atlantic trade routesby the Parana and 
Plate Rivers. 
Ocean-going steamers call at Buenos Aires and Rosario, 
on the Plate and Parana Rivers, respectively, where splendid 
harbor conditions pe~it easy loading of cargoes. At 
Rosario, the world's largest corn port, grain slides down 
chutes by gravity from the port's warehouses to the steamers 
on the river. At Buenos Aires some packinghouses are located 
alongside the docks, and dressed carcasses move directly 
from packinghouses aboard ship by means of conveyors. 
There is a heavy two-way trade between Argentina and 
the United States and Argentina and European countries. 
Hundreds of steamships, loaded with grain and meat, annually 
move from Rosario and Buenos Aires, Argentina, to Europe. on 
returning, they bring manufactured goods, coal and bricks. 
Argentine trade in normal times is predominantly with Europe 
i and secondarily with the United States. 
,I 
This country takes 
il wool, hides, skins and sometimes maize and sends manufac-
1! 
II 
--i( 
tured goods especially farm machinery, and chemicals in return. 
-- -· - ---'-----· --- ---·- ---· - ___________ ,_ 
. 
There is also a three-way movement of vessels from 
Europe to Cape Town, South Africa, thence to Buenos Aires, 
and back to Europe. Vessels discharge at Cape Town and gen-
erally find no cargo to carry back to Europe. Hence, they 
make the 3 1 600-mile trip across the southern Atlantic and 
pick up cargo at Buenos Aires or Rosario. Argentina exports 
more cargo than it imports, which makes the three-way trade 
possible. There is little trade between Argentina and Africa, 
although they are relatively near each other. 
soil conditions. The majority of the Argentine people 
live in the rich Pampa region, which on the north reaches the 
Chaco, on the west the highlands rising to the Andes, and on 
the south Patagonia, and is itself situated in the center of 
the seaboard. The Pampa takes in about one-fourth of Argenti-
na, including the large cities, and is the most extensive 
temperate plain in the Southern Hemisphere. Although it 
1
:, appears to be perfectly level. the Pampa rises gradually west-
,, 
>I 
'I I 
ward from the Atlantic at an average rate of about three feet 
I' 
'I :I 
per mile. The area of arable crop land in Argentina totals 
:j over sixty million acres. 3 
,, 
:,I For the most part, the Pampa, Mesopotamia and the Chaco 
,, 
II 
'' are marshy areas, and therefore poorly drained. The rivers i: 
. j, 
j'
1 
of the Pampa rarely flow in well-defined channels. Due to 
!i evaporation, many of these rivers fail to reach the sea. 
1 
The Pampa contains few rivers except near the Plate estuary 
==---==~-' ~--.,::::.·::-_-::- ~ - ~-·c:-=.=:...::::-:-.:=-:_- -_ .-:-~-=::o..::::-:::-=.=-~:..~...::-c:=·=--:-::=:-_ --:--:-::-=oc::: -::: ::::_-::._ -
I 
i: 
-~--~-~---------·-··-----~·- ---' ··- ------
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" 
_:I 
and on the Atlantic coastline. Several streams begin, flow 
a few miles and disappear, because the water enters depression~ 
and is absorbed by the soil. Underground drainage predominates, 
and the water table is only a few feet below the surface of 
the earth in many places. Railroad and highway construction, 
as well as farming in the Pampa, are influenced by this type 
of drainage. 
The soils of the Pampa are of alluvial origin. They 
are very deep and free of stones and pebbles. There is a 
large zone of fertile, black loan near the Parana River, which 
is very favorable for ~ize production. The soils tend to 
become light and sandy toward the interior. About two hun-
dred miles west of Buenos Aires, where the Pampa is drier, 
there are many sand dunes, while in the eastern part of 
Buenos Aires Province, there are heavy clay soils. 
Climate. Argentina extends north and south through 
thirty three degrees of latitude, a distance as great as 
that between Cuba and Labrador, and ranges in elevation 
from sea level to 23,000 feet. Ita climate is tropical in 
the north, temperate in the middle, cold in the south, 
humid in the east and north, and semi-arid in the west and 
south. 
Since rainfall fluctuates greatly, the production 
of cereals varies widely from year to year. On the western 
edge of the Pampa, rains are never heavy. In years of good 
rainfall, grain can be grown, but during years of scanty 
---''·='"oF~'·=. ====-·ccc~~-~·--·==-~-~~==-·~=-j, 
-6- v 
rainfall, this is impossible. In the humid northeastern 
Pampa where rainfall is heavier, yields are more constant 
and the plants suffer only during periods of severe drought. 
The region around Rosario and Pergamino rarely has a 
drought, but in the surrounding country dry years occur. 
The mild winter temperature on the Pampa permits 
livestock to graze the year around. The growing season 
from one killing frost to the next varies from about 237 
days around the city of Buenos Aires to about 141 days 
on the Atlantic edge of the Pampa at Mardel Plata. The 
cool Falkland Island ocean current strikes the coastline 
facing south between Bahia Blanca and Mar del Plata. 
This lessens the summer temperature as indicated by the 
longer frost season. The summers are so cool that maize 
does not thrive in the southeastern Pampa. Thus, the 
land is used for pasturage and wheat. On the other hand, 
the summers are hot in the northwest Pampa around Rosario 
and Santa Fe, the center of grain and flax production. 
In the vicinity of Buenos Aires, annual rainfall is from 
thirty seven to forty one inches, which is sufficient 
1
' for the rich soil to yield its abundant annual harvest. 
Mesopotamia is the wettest region, receiving forty-
odd inches of rainfall annually. :Meanwhile the Chaco, 
1""\ center of Argentina's cotton production, has a hot, humid 
climate, with an average annual rainfall of thirty six 
inches.4 
-7-
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Patagonia lies in the rain shadow of the Andes, 
i' which means that although rain is heavy on the Chilean 
side, there is generally less than ten inches of rainfall 
1 annually in patagonia. Annual rainfall increases from 
twelve to thirty six inches from northern to southern Tierra 
del FUego, but because of low temperature all year, shallow 
soils, and strong winds, plant life is limited to a heavy 
growth of grass with a light growth of short, scrubby 
trees in the lower regions of the Tierra del FUego. 
To sum up, we mfght conclude that Argentina is very 
richly endowed with beneficial climatic factors and very 
rich soil in the Pampa for production of agricultural com-
modities of fine quality, and in large volume. This is 
the reason why, despite the lack of sufficient capital 
and agricultural machinery, Argentina became one of the 
largest producers:. and exporters of grains and meat. 
The people. The overwhelming majority of Argen-
tineans, probably more than ninety percent of them, are 
people of unmixed European descent. In colonial times, 
European inhabitants of Argentina were exclusively of Span-
ish descent. After the middle of the nineteenth century, 
large groups of other Europeans migrated to Argentina. 
There are probably 50,000 pure Indiana in Argentina, 
and they live mainly in the northern.territories of Jujuy, 
catamarca, Salta, Formosa, Chaco and Misiones, and their 
number has been decreasing. A few hundred live in Patagonia, 
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' including Tierra del Fuego. In the northern territories, 
there are considerable numbers of mestizos, people of mixed 
Spanish and Indian origin. Elsewhere, however, there are 
few Indians and mestizos. The number of Negroes in Argen-
1 tina is negligible. 
About seventy seven percent of the Argentine people 
are native-born individuals of European ancestry, twenty 
percent are Europeans by birth, and three percent Indians 
or native-born Argentineans with some Indian ancestry. 
Of the Europeans by birth, Italians predominate. Since 1857, 
about one half of all immigrants have been Italians, a third 
Spaniards, and a fifth have represented some sixty three 
5 
other nationalities. 
From 1860 through 1945, a total of 6.7 million people 
migrated to Argentina. A total of 3.2 million emigrated, 
however, giving a net migration figure of 3.5 million. As 
these figures indicate, a large number of immigrants later 
6 
returned home. 
Population growth and settlement. 
Argentina r s population has increased rapidly and stead-
ily as the figures in Table I (see page 10) indicate. In 
1947 about half the total population of 16,1081 000 lived in 
rural areas and the remainder in cities. Many of the immigrants 
settled in rural areas but later moved to the cities. 
The largest city is Buenos Aires. It occupies the 
-9-
in the United states. This cityts population in 1947 was 
three million. In 1940 it was the worldts tenth largest 
city, the third largest in the Western Hemisphere (after 
New York and Chicago), and the largest in the Southern 
7 
Hemisphere. 
Rosario is the second largest city in Argentina 
(population 515,000). It is attractive and modern, situated 
in the center of the maize belt on the Paran River, some 
250 miles from Buenos Aires. Important cities north of 
' Rosario include Santa Fe (147,000) and Parana (72,000). 
La Plata (193,000) is thirty five miles below Buenos Aires 
on the La Plata estuary. 
Bahia Blanca (110 1 000) is the largest city in the 
south, and in the west cordoba (273,000), Tucuman (149,000) 
. and Mendoza (82,000) are the most populous. 
i! 
About one-fifth of the nation's population live in 
the city of Buenos Aires. Some 4.4 million, or almost one-
fourth of the total, live in Buenos Aires Province, which 
embraces most of the Pampa region. An additional 3.9 million 
" live in the Provinces of Santa Fe, Cordoba and Entre Rios, 
which adjoin Buenos Aires Province. Thus, some seventy per-
cent of the total population centers in an area including 
and immediately adjacent to the Pampa, which covers about 
a quarter of the total national area. Elsewhere the papu-
lation is widely scattered with only a few persons to the 
8 
square mile. 
-10-
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TABLE I 
GROWTH OF THE POPULATION OF ARGENTINA I FROM 161&3 TO ;1.951 
YEAR POPULATION YEAR POPULATION 
1819 527,000 1915 8,042,000 
1837 675,000 1920 8,696,000 
1860 1,210,000 1925 10,081,000 
1869 1,830,000 1930 11,452,000 
1895 4,045,000 1935 12,376,000 
1900 4,794,000 1940 13,321,000 
:; 
! 1905 5,678,000 1945 14,400,000 
1910 6,587,000 1947 16,108,000 
* 1950 17,111,000 
source: Oscar K. Moore, Argentine Farming and Farm Trade, 
Foreign Agricultural Report Number 251 JUne, 19481 Office 
of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Dept. of 
Agriculture, Washington, D. c., page 16. 
~~ 
Source of 1950 figure: The World Almanac and~ of 
1! Facts, edited by Harry Hansen, published annually by 
I! 
1: New York World-Telegram, New York, N.y., .copywright 
' 1952, page 307. 
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Development of farming ~ agricultural trade. 
The early settlers were semi-nomadic cattlemen whose 
herds roamed the open ranges. Their products were hides and 
dried and salted beef. Large numbers of immigrant farmers 
, arrived in Argentina from Europe after 1850 and multiplied 
rapidly. Settlers moved farther and farther out on the 
plains. The railroad construction which was started in 1857 
was the beginning of the extensive railroad system now found 
tbroughou t the HUmid Pampa. 
As rail and ocean transportation developed, the land 
was fenced, and beef became the important livestock product. 
Because of exceptional soil fertility, portions of the land 
were cultivated. An increasing demand for foodstuffs in 
Europe stimulated the flow of domestic and foreign capital 
(especially the latter) into the production, processing and 
transportation of farm products. In this manner, farming 
expanded and the resulting export trade boom became the 
foundation of the Argentine economy. 
Three years after the invention of refrigeration in 
1873, frozen mutton was exported from Buenos Aires to Eng-
land, and later frozen beef was shipped. Beef was not ex-
ported in any quantity, however, until about the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
Improved animals replaced scrub cattle to a great ex-
tent during the last two decades 0£ the nine~eenth century. 
Argentine producers imported good beef animals from Eng-
I' =~~ cco=~oic~c c c~·-:o=c · co=:cc~--.=o·.·. :c ~~:=.·= 
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land and carefully mated them in fenced pastures. The 
resulting types of animals required better feed and care. 
Consequently, cultivated pastures were used, and alfalfa 
was grown throughout large areas. Because of the advances 
made in breeding, herd management, feeding, conditioning, 
marketing, processing and shipping, large quantities of 
prime-quality Argentine meat were exported to Europe. 
However, if we have observed that the grazing of cattle and 
the export of meat are important elements in the general 
exports of Argentina, we must note that grain exports are the 
largest item. 
Fluctuations _E! grain exports. In most parts of the 
Humid Pampa, grazing has been accompanied by increased 
j' attention to the cultivation of crops. Of the several crops 
I! 
in the HUmid Pampa not used for the feeding of animals, wheat, 
maize, barley and flax are the four leaders. \~eat was the 
earliest of these; and the increased planting of wheat was 
followed by an increased demand for alfalfa. The total area 
occupied by wheat, maize, barley and flax was somewhat more 
than thirty million acres at the start of World War I. 
After the War this acreage was cut, and in the depression year 
of 1921-22 the low point of twenty six million acres was 
il 
i reached, but in the crop year 1930-31 the total acreage sown 
I 
'I 
II 
I 
to these four crops was forty four million. However the area 
sown to grains durisg Worl.d Wll.r II was greatly curtailed due 
I 
I! to the lack of shipping space (to transport grains to Europe), 
!I I. 
!: 
, -_: 
J..•.• 
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and due to the requirements of the British to use all avail-
able space to transport meat; by 1945-46 there were only 
9 
thirty million acres sown to grains. 
By the outbreak of World War II, Argentina was the 
world's leading producer and exporter of flaxseed, the second 
largest producer and leading exporter of maize; the sixth 
producer and second ranking exporter of wheat; the sixth 
producer and leading exporter of oats; and second largest 
10 
producer and first-ranking exporter of sunflower seed. 
• 
11 During World War II, the world market absorbed less 
'!I 
than half the usual quantities of Argentine cereals, flax-
seed and wool, but it continued to absorb meats at prewar, 
and even higher levels. By 1944 Argentine grain exports 
dropped to 60% of their average value during 1934-38, but 
exports of livestock products by then were 225 percent of 
prewar value. 
Despite a decline in volume, the value of Argentina's 
export trade increased during World War II because of higher 
prices; shifted in composition towards products of relatively 
:,1. higher value per ton, such as meat (especially frozen, boned 
>I 
' I' ) 
:1, meat , dairy products, dehydrated eggs, and vegetable oils; 
I. 
:,1 and away from wheat, corn and oilseeds. When cereal exports 
' I! I! decreased in tonnage, maize and vegetable oils were burned 
,, 
1,'; for power and heat, because coal and petroleum could not 
\1 be imported. 
i' 
!1, 
:! Production of rice, oats, barley, sunflower seed, 
=======-- ---- =·-· =···· 
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pork, lard, mutton, and lamb increased during the war. By 
its end, the nation was about self-sufficient in rice. 
Argentina continued to be the world's leading producer and 
exporter of flaxseed. Prior to the war, oilseeds were 
exported but a large oilseed-crushing industry was developed 
during the war. Thus, vegetable oils have been exported since 
the war ended, and little or no oilseed. Pork, lard, and 
' poultry production increased greatly during the war, but 
· high grain prices in 1946 sent the output of these items 
downward. 
Although maize was the most important export crop in 
:1 the interwar years (representing about one-fifth the value 
'of all exports during 1935-39 with wheat just a little less), 
.wheat is traditionally the main item of interest in Argentina's 
i agricultural production. Farm products, serving as the major 
i! 
'raw materials of Argentine industry, accounted for about 94 
'percent of the nation's exports on a value basis from 1921 
through 1944. 
The population of Argentina is small in relation to 
its agricultural capacity. The people are among the worldts 
largest per capita consumers of beef and wheat; yet exports 
of grain and meat are large because of the relatively small 
i size of the population. 
:I 
The grazing of cattle on alfalfa and natural forage, 
\With no supplemental feeding of grain and protein meals, ia 
!rnother factor in low domestic consumption of feedstuffs 
i~nd large exports. 
1: 
As a result, Argentina ranks as one of 
=~,~=c·c:. 
:j 
I! 
=~~•.-. ·o~------
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the leading exporters of many commodities. During the 
period l92l-45, 57 percent of the wheat, 58 percent of the 
maize, 43 percent of the oats, 78 percent of the flaxseed, 
36 percent of the beef and veal, and 42 percent of the mutton 
ll 
and lamb, by volume, were exported. 
The leading crops. 
Crops which comprise the great majority of the grain 
i: production are wheat and maize. The wheat and maize area 
totaled 26,000,000 acres during the crop year l92l-22, which 
was a depression year; however, in the year l930-3l, the total 
acreage of these crops rose to about 44,000,000. The area 
sown to wheat varies annually, more irregularly than the 
combines area planted to other grains. It totaled more than 
l71 000,000 acres prior to World war I, and in 1928-29, 
23,0001 000 acres were sown to wheat. Despite the fact that 
many nations could not afford wheat, due to the Depression 
in the l930•s, as a result of droughts in the united states, 
there was a large Argentine wheat area of over 20,000,000 
l2 
acres in 1938-39. 
II r The area in which maize is grown remained fairly steady 
i' from l92l to 1928, but after 1928, when maize prices increased 
" 
I! 
.I 
in relation to wheat prices, the area sown to maize was 
expanded. More maize than wheat was planted in the HUmid 
11 Pampa, during the crop year 1935-36. Since that time however, 
'I 
II wheat acreage has surpassed the area sown to maize. The 
,, 
:1 
'I ii Maize District generally produces enough to place Argentina 
===- •==ii=~====~--~••.•c ·-· ··~--•·•~-·~=•---·-- ··-,~-•·••~-~~= 
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second only to the North American Corn Belt among the 
maize-growing regions of the world~ This area differs from 
all other similar regions in its stress on maize as an export 
crop, since about eighty percent of the crop is exported. 
Growth of agricultural production and exports. 
About 1870 Argentina exports consisted almost entirely 
(95%) of products of stock-raising (wool, hides, dried meat, 
and sundry others of minor importance). Agriculture was 
then responsible for less than one percent of her total 
exports, but as time went on, it gradually gained in impor-
tance, and by the end of the last century already accounted 
·. !'or thirty one percent of the value of exports, against 64 
percent corresponding to the livestock industry. 
DUring the first decade of the present century, exports 
of agricultural products outstripped those of pastoral 
products, and in 1905-09, their share of this figure amounted 
to 58 percent; although this figure declined somewhat during 
'• 1910-14, agriculture maintained first place with 51 percent 
of exports, as against 45 percent for the livestock industry, 
·· which again took over the lead during World War I, the respec-
, tive percentages being 55 percent and 39 percent. After World 
:War I 1 agriculture recovered the position it held in the 
.. 
',five years before the war, and its share of the total value of' 
' 
I' Argentine export :llrade remained at about 59 percent until 
i' 
n 19371 while pastoral production' a contribution was reduced 
i' 13 
!I to 37%. 
.·:-::- ·--= -·-o 
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Thus if we ignore the declines occurring in certain 
years, as a result of crop failures and the stabilization 
of output noticeable during World War I, we can see that 
the physical volume of agricultural production rose con-
stantly from 1891 to 1929. This increase is more pronounced 
in the years prior to World war I than in the years immediately 
following. From 1929 onwards, expansion ceased and production 
remained stable up to 1937. In 1935 there was an exception-
ally large maize crop which should not be talten into reckoning 
when considering long-run developments. The following is a 
stumnary of the trends of physical volume of farm products 
and their corresponding prices from 1890 to 1933. 
UP to the start of World War I, value followed 
physical volume very closely, as agricultural 
prices showed no well-defined tendency; they fell 
from 1890 to 1906, then rose until 1910, and sub-
sequently remained steady. During World War I, 
on the contrary, prices increased remarkably, 
and value rose above physical volume to a con-
siderable extent. 
After World war I, the. value of agricultural pro-
duction remained stationary until 19291 well above 
the level of its physical volume. The explanation 
lies in the fact that the fall in prices was offset 
by the increase in quantity. It may be added that 
the rise in prices which occurred during World War I 
disappeared gradually from 1920 onwards through a 
series of "ups and downs", or cycles, which grew 
more acute as time passed.l4 
We may see that prices have not been the predominant 
I 
1
: factor in this development; for market quotations in Argentine 
" 1: paper pesos either remained stationary or declined, except 
,, 
::between 1907-10. Undoubtedly what contributed most to 
!I , 
[. 
. 11 encourage the progress of agriculture was the reduction in 
'T.' ------------- -
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construction, and to a lesser degree, the use of mechanical 
harvesting implements. In addition, this expansion was 
1 
furthered by the large number of immigrants entering the 
country at that time, as we said previously. 
1 n 
..,__,! 
Between 1911-13 and 1919-21, the area under culti-
vation underwent a alight decrease. The explanation is to be 
found in the expansion of stock-raising during World War I, 
which was due to the more pronounced increase in livestock 
1 
prices, than in agricultural prices in that period. 
New ar~icultural expansion. 
In 1922, simultaneously with the slump experienced by 
the livestock industry, a new period of expansion in agri-
culture begins. The area under cultivation again increases 
considerably year after year, until 1928. From 14 million 
hectares in the period 1911-13, it rises to 19 milJ.ion 
1 
hectares in 1928. This must be largely due to the fact that 
~· the prices for agricultural products at that time were very 
:I 
high, and that agriculture was more profitable than stock-
' 15 
' raising. 
From 1928 on, the area under crops remains unchanged, 
apart from a few minor fluctuations, varying between 19 to 
20 million hectares, if we except the 1934 peak when the 
record figure of 21 million hectares was reached. This 
i' indicates that the abrupt fall in agricultural prioe levels 
I 
I since 1930 did not affect the total acreage under cultivation. 
Grain exports follow.closely the trend of production. 
-19-
After a sharp rise during the pre-World War I period, they 
remained stable during the War and thereafter resumed the 
-. J 
upward movement to reach a maximum in the years immediately 
i; preceding 1929. 
II 
During this time, except between 1910-14, 
i! 
I' 
"". ,, 
exports of all grains fluctuated in a like manner. After 
19281 total exports remained almo~t unchanged, but while 
wheat and linseed shipments declined slightly, maize ship-
ments increased, thereby following a similar trend to that 
noted in production. The statistics in Table II (see Page 20 ), 
which show the annual average for all five-year periods from 
1871 to 1934, give a general outline of the fluctuations to 
which we referred. 
There are two periods of expansion distinguished in 
the history of Argentine agriculture; one extending from the 
early days until the outbreak of World war I, and the other 
covering the period from 1918 to 1929. 
The first period of expansion came as a result of in-
creased colonization and development, originated by the growth 
of railroad construction. From 1913 onwards, progress ceased 
as a result of the advance of the pastoral industry, which 
became more profitable than agriculture. 
The origin of the second period of expansion can be 
traced to the slump in cattle prices, as well as the situation 
of the world grain markets, which kept agricultural prices on 
a relatively high level. After 1929 there was a sharp drop 
in prices, and the acreage and production of farm products 
--- ----=--=:--·--=-o=-=== 
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TABLE II 
FOUR-YEAR AVERAGES OF EXPORTS OF GRAINS AND LINSEED (IN TONS), 1871-1934 
PERIOD WHEAT MAIZE LDISEED FEED GRAINS TOTAL 
1871-74 98 1,424 4 220 1,746 
1875-79 5,687 12,937 70 58 18,752 
1880-84 34,456 55,951 17,552 549 108,508 
1885-89 111,192 277,191 51,349 855 440,595 
1890-94 761,989 265,?03 52,511 2,170 1,082,373 
1895-99 800,541 910,231 209,042 9,549 1,929,363 
1900-04 1,492,985 1,518,460 475,433 19,754 3,506,632 
1905-09 2,789,499 2,035,595 779,979 224,224 5,829,297 I I ro 1910-14 2,118,255 3,193, 976 678,881 631,529 6,622,641 0 
1915-19 2,404,977 2,249,718 601,850 551,381 5,807,926 I 
1920-24 3,723,925 3,504,680 1,150,196 577,020 8,955,821 
1925-29 4,232,573 5,521;307 1,618,048 772,271 12,144,199 
1930-34 3,603,385 6,396,575 1,568,863 989,659 12,558,482 
source: Economic Review, Series II, Vo1Ullle I, NUlllber 1, Bureau of Economic Research, 
Banco ~tra~ de 1a RepubJica ArGentina, Buenos Aires, Arcentina, 1937. 
pac;e 2 • 
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were curtailed, while a shift from other grains to maize was 
. noted. This shift was explained by the fact that maize prices 
• were higher than wheat prices. The increase made by 
agricultural production during the twentieth century was 
1
• fostered by the steady demand from those countries wishing to 
purchase Argentine agricultural commodities. 
As expected, production and exports closely followed 
I the ups and downs of world pr>ices and total world demand. 
The whole agricultural production, however, showed a steady 
··increase in Argentina until near the outbreak of World War II. 
' This process of steady growth was not abated by obstacles of 
such magnitude as world War I and the Great Depression. 
We may conclude that this process of growth was mainly 
., the outcome of two overwhelmingly important factors: 
1. the exceptional fitness of Argentina for low-cost, 
good-quality agricultural and pastoral production 
2. the liberal policies followed by the Government of 
traditionally democratic Argentina 
ijThat this latter factor has had such an important bearing on 
!lthis trend of well-founded expansion of agricultural and 
pastoral production is demonstrated by recent developments 
in Argentina, whereby the government policies of direct 
intervention have led to a catastrophic fall in agricultural 
and pastoral production and exports. This is one of the points 
that will become apparent as a result of this study. 
~~-=-=-=====-
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CHAPTER II 
PERIOD BASIS OF COMPARISON: PRE-WAR YEARS, 1935-39 
we use the period 1935-39 as a base because in comparison 
to the period 1929-35, and the period 1939-46 (periods of 
!j [: 
:1 depression and war 1 respectively) 1 the span 1935-39 was a 
i: 
II normal period during which no wars or depressions occurred. 
I 
11 The period 1935-39 is also used as a base since it was the 
ll 
1
; normal period chronologically closest to that under study 
,I here ( 1946-51). 
II ,, 
,, 
Argentina had become one of the largest agricultural 
exporters in the world prior to World War I, due to the 
i! growth of farm production, which left a large export surplus 
:I 
~~ after satisfying the domestic market. The upward trend in 
.I 
" II agricultural exports continued during and after World war I, 
;I 
1 16 
1l growing in the 1920's and reaching its peak in 1928. 
II 
li p 
,I 
The world crisis of the l930ts caused a downward trend, 
j 1 but did not displace Argentina from her important position as 
:I 
1: a supplier of the world market. 
' . 
During the period 1935-39, 
I! il she was the largest exporter of corn and linseed, and ranked 
:I 
'i! second in shipments of wheat. Her 
. • tural products are listed in Table 
1935-39 exports of agricul-
17 
III (see page 24) • 
Importance to economy of agricultural exports. 
In 1903 for the first time, the total value of Argentine 
-23-
maize, wheat and linseed exports exceeded the value of exports 
of animal products. In the 1930's the importance of agricul-
tural and pastoral commodities began to decline, but in no 
·• year preceding World War II did their value fall below ninety 
three percent of total export value. Argentina lives on her 
exports of agricultural products, hence exports of these 
products are vital to the economic well-being of Argentina. 
19371 record year for export of farm commodities. 
In 1937, exports of cereals amounted to 409 million 
pesos ($126.2 millions), and comprised twenty percent of 
the total value of exports as compared to 1947, when these 
shipments amounted to 21 030 million pesos ($604.4 millions), 
and constituted thirty eight percent of the total value of 
exports. Yet the quantity of cereals exported in 1947 was 
i! barely one-third as great as the quantity of cereals exported 
i: 
in 19371 when the great bulk of exported cereals consisted of 
'!wheat and maize. In the period 1935-39, 1937 claimed a record 
in export volume of farm products, with the quantity of maize 
18 
being thrice that for wheat. 
The quantities of maize exported, however, have fluc-
tuated more than the quantities of wheat. DUring 1935-39 1 
this fluctuation was due to a number of factors, including 
the natural problem of even distribution of rainfall for a 
!' good crop, the European drive for self-sufficiency (resulting 
' 
\1 in a sharp drop in agricultural exports to Europe), and on 
!, the· other hand, tremendously large shipments of maize to the 
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TABLE III 
PRE-WAR EXPORTS OF AGRICUL'IURAL COI.!MODITIES IN TONS, 1935-39 
:YEAR 
1935 
'· 1936 
'. 1937 
1938 ii 
WHEAT MAIZE 
3,860,043 7,051,460 
1,610,386 8,381,390 
3,887,195 9,087,363 
1,940,356 2,642,150 
OATS BARLEY RYE 
-----
.... 
1, 035,794,. ------
246,994 134,579 
254,496 92,332 
.I 
I 1939 4,745,944 3,196,073 
175,760 
403,397 
381,795 
359,791 
211,650 
259,513 
52,312 
194,851 
,, 
11# Annual 
I Average 
(1935-39) 
in tons: 
* 
3,208,785 6,071,687 330,186 243,163 118,518 
denotes total exports in 1935 for oats, barley and 
rye; this figure is not included in the yearly average 
for barley, 1935-39. 
#the figures for the annual averages (1935-39) are the 
work of the author. 
source: Anuario del comercio Exterior, 1944, Buenos Aires,, 
Argent1na;-p. 136. 
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r' United states, which suffered severe droughts and damage 
,, to its maize crops in 1935-36 and 1937. 
! 
Individual agricultural connnodities. 
Wheat. In 1936-371 according to the Agricultural Census, 
twenty eight percent of the area under cultivation was planted 
to wheat. Argentina accounted for about four-f·ifths of the 
,, total South American production of wheat, and about one-twen-
tieth of the total world output. The crop year 1936-37 was 
' a normal year with a good-sized crop. During the period 
1935-39 1 wheat exports averaged 3.2 million tons annually, 
(see page 24 1 Table III), or about one-fourth of the annual 
average 1935-39 production total of twelve million tons of 
19 
·,wheat, maize, linseed, oats, barley and rye. 
Argentine wheat has won favor in export markets mainly 
' 
on the basis of its low price; unlike canadian wheat, which 
is an essential ingredient for moat flours, Argentine wheat 
can be dispensed with if circumstances make it convenient. 
Before World war II, about two-fifths of Argentine wheat 
I 
!1 exports went to European nations, principally Belguim and the 
. Netherlands; about one-fifth went to Great Britain, and moat 
I! 
, of the rest went to south American countries, especially 
20 
Brazil. 
Fluctuations in wheat exports. 
II There were wide fluctuations in the Argentine wheat crop 
1
11, during this period; from a low of 1.6101 386 tons in 1936 1 
rl ,, 
.o ~-I! 
II 
II ,,, 
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i,, wheat exports in 1939 were exceptionally high, as in the four 
!i 
;,
1 crop years 1935-38, annual wheat exports averaged only 2.8 
I' ,, 
1
1 million tons (see Table III, page 24). one cause of irregular 
,. 
:; 
·, fluctuations in wheat production and exports are crop losses 
II 
I' 
11 or "bad crops". 
I' 
Although Argentine wheat producers were hurt 
:: 
1
'1 greatly by the loss of Europe as a market in World War II, 
:I 
1: exports did not decline to the low levels of some pre-war 
'years, such as 1936 and 19381 the years in which European 
:1 nations cut their purchases of Argentine farm products and 
" 21 
I! staged self-sufficiency drives. 
il 
' Maize. Before World War II, about four-fifths of the 
;i 
'!'I production of maize was exported, and it was usually the 
::largest export connnodity in terms of both value and quantity. 
II 
:
11
Although Argentina normally accounted for about two-thirds 
ii of the world trade in maize, yet its total production was 
:I 
:·
1 
only about one-seventh that of the United states, which 
il ranked first in world production. From 1935-39, more land 
I' 
1
,was sown to maize than to any other crop, because maize 
! 
'i 
':obtained a relatively higher price on the international 
22 
:1market. 
,, 
\ 
1: Fluctuations in maize production and exports. 
i' Maize production (and exports) fluctuated more than 
' i] 
lother crops, because good rainfall evenly, distributed over 
ithe entire area sown to maize is required, more so than for 
,: 
i! 
=cc=c _ ~o~l_l,~r~ ~~ 1~~ • .. ~Z:~~-!I;~ic~--~V~ll di stribution_,o,! ra~~!!!l:L w~s JW~-. ~~· 'I'=~=.~.~~.=~-
-27-
':forthcoming. Maize also requires much moisture early in the 
23 
· growing season, if a large crop is desired. 
Maize production in Argentina developed primarily because 
of the demand for a low-priced feed by the live-stock indus-
tries in Great Britain and in European nations. Before World 
War II, Argentina exported more than one-third of her maize 
,; production annually to Great Britain, and more than two-fifths 
I; 
" to European countries, especially the Netherlands and Belgium. 
In the period 1935-39 1 maize exports averaged six million tons 
,, annually (see Table III, page 24); they varied widely, however, 
·. ranging from 2.6 million tons in 1938 to 9.8 million tons in 
'I 1937. small maize harvests in several years ( 1938 and 1939) 
::accounted for some of the variation; another factor was the 
: development of European self-sufficiency drives, to Which 
' we have alluded previously. very large maize purchases 
by the united Sta es in 1935, 1936 and 19371 because of damage 
to crops caused by drought, compensated for reduced European 
,, purchases. These large exports to the United States accounted 
' for the huge sewings and resulting exports ( 9.8 million tons 
': 
'exported in 1937, when severe droughts in the united States 
,. 24 
destroyed the grain crop) • 
oats. During 1935-39, about half of the oats crop was 
i, exported. The Netherlands and Belgium were the largest pur-
':'I chasers, but Germany and Denmark also bought substantial 
1\ quantities. From 1936-39 the average annual oats export 
lifigure was 264,149 tons, but it actually rose from a low of 
" . 
=-::==-:·- =fc=-::c::·_ -.::.-:-.-:-;-==' -::.::--_:_-:..:. c---:-:c~~====-:o-:-=.c=-=~=~- _____ ------= -_·;coc:·c-,::.·-:-·.:;::.o_c-·:--
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175,760 tons in 1936, to approximately 380,000 tons from the 
25 
years 1937-39. 
Barley. , Argentine statistics do not show exports of 
barley by type, but it is known that they consisted chiefly 
of grain for feed purposes. Between 1936-39, export shipments 
t totaled 973,653 tons. The Netherlands and Belgium were the 
principal purchasers. The 1956-39 annual average of 243,163 
tons varied very little from the actual figures for these 
years: 246,994 (1936), 254,496 (1937), 211,650 (1938) and 
i! 
26 
259,513 (1939). 
Rye. Before World War II, about three-fifths of the rye 
crop was exported; between 1936-39, exports totaled 474 1 074 
tons. The Netherlands, Norway and Belgium were the principal 
markets. There were wide variations of export totals from 
1936-391 from a low point of 52,312 tons in 1938, to a peak 
of 194,851 tons in 1939. The average annual export figure for 
the four-year period 1936-39 was 94,815 tons, which approximated 
27 
the 1937 export total of 92,332 tons. 
~~ canary Seed. Although canary seed is a minor crop in 
II ~gentina, in comparison with wheat, maize and linseed, about 
1! one-half of the world's commercial output is grown there. I' il 
!j 11Alpiste 11 , as the seed is known in Argentina, is considered 
1,·, 
I, a desirable feed for birds, partly because of its spicy flavor. 
11 The western part of the Province of Buenos Aires is the loca-
11 tion of canary seed production. During 1936-39, 34,714 tons 
--"--- _ll_ - ---~---- -- _. _.::_.,-~--=.::. ~-=·=---:-=-=--==~==-----=-::--_:_- ---=-=-----::-----=-=-..:; -. 
-------- - - ~~--
-_~-:-:-_~--:::::::-=="" 
-29-
were exported, and since 1936 1 about one-half the total exports 
28 
of canary seed have gone to the united states. 
Linseed. Flax, grown primarily for seed to be used in 
the production of oil, ranked fourth in acreage among Argentine 
crops; only wheat, alfalfa andmaize exceeded it during the 
period 1935-39. Argentina normally produced about one-half 
of the world flaxseed crop, and exported about four-fifths 
of the world's flaxseed volume. During the period 1935-39, 
::Argentine flaxseed exports ranged from a low of 1.2 million 
tons in 19391 to a peak of 1.8 million tons in 1937 (see 
Table III, page 24). Thus the fluctuation in this crop was 
not very wide, as it was in the case of maize. Until 1937, 
' the Netherlands was the largest purchaser of Argentine flaxseed, 
•1 followed by the United sta es, France, Be lgiu.m and the United 
·Kingdom. In 1937, the United st'i!tes became the largest pur-
'chaser. 
., 
World War II cut Argentina off from her mainstay market, 
continental Europe, leaving only Great Britain and the United 
'States as important markets. The 1935-39 annual average 
jexports of linseed totaled 11 5031 192 tons, there being very ,, 
.',little variation between the average annual figure for the 
29 
'period, and the actual figures for each year. 
Grain Regulating Board. 
Regarding the official policy towards agricultural pro-
li ~~uction and exports during the period 1935-391 we find that 
II 
,: 
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Government. In November, 19331 Minister Pinedo depreciated 
the Argentine currency, in order to gain a more favorable 
position in international trade for Argentine products. On 
November 28, 1933, he also created the Grain Regulating Board, 
to guarantee cereal growers the full benefit of this change 
in the value of the currency, by controlling the sale of 
wheat, so as to prevent any sudden offers by Argentine expor-
ters on the· international market in very great volume, and 
thus force down world grain prices generally. 
Funds for subsidizing grain producers \'lere made 
available by the "profits" accruing to the Government in the 
difference between ita buying and selling rates of exchange, 
as a result of the exchange control mechanism which it had set 
up. 
30 
Beneficial actions £! ~ Grain Regulating Board. 
Annual pre-war (1935-39) exports, of which the largest 
part was composed of agricultural products, averaged 1770 
. -_-r,-
.. million pesos, and annual imports of goods totaled 1304 milli.on 
!: 
i' pesos, a favorable balance of 466 million pesos annually. 
'i 
]! This was sufficient to cover the payment of dividends and 
i 
!, interest abroad. Thus it may be noted that despite the 
:1 difficulties in trade as a result of the Great Depression 
I ii and the drastic reduction in purchases of farm products by 
1
•
1
, European nations as part of a self-sufficiency program in the 
I' ~pre-war years, -~-~~-e~tine far~-~po~_ts, operating under otherwise+--~~-~- ____ _ 
===~---=~:--~--===~~-~-=- ---------- -~----- - --
11 
I' :! 
I 
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normal trade conditions, managed to achieve a good-sized 
favorable balance of trade. The Grain Regulating Board 
merely supported prices so as to aid farmers in the difficult 
financial years; however, when trade conditions improved in 
1936, the Grain Regulating Board removed ita price supports, 
and did not replace them until 1939, when the farmers required 
aid as a result 'of conditions brought about by the start of 
31 
:i world War II. 
We shall perceive, in a later period, how the agricultural. 
economy, if hampered in ita production and exports of crops 
by detrimental government controls, instead of government aida, 
is unable to function well, as it did during 1935-39, when it 
controlled its own production and exports, with the Government 
simply lending a helping hand in those years when such aid was 
needed. 
In the next chapter we will analyze how the war affected 
the farm production and exports of Argentina. 
(Note: Production figures for wheat, maize and rye 
;, for the years 1935-39 are listed in Table XIV, p./t) ~). 
:j 
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CHAPTER III 
THE WAR YEARS, 1940-46 
As has been noted, prior to World War II Argentina 
produced and exported various agricultural commodities, but 
maize, wheat and linseed were far more important than all 
the other items combined, since they composed eighty eight 
percent of the pre-war volume of all crop exports. Due to 
the war, exports of all grains were greatly reduced, but 
wheat and linseed remained as important exports. Maize 
became insignificant, one factor being the British policy 
against import of feed-grains, in order to conserve shipping 
space. The British shipping shortage was an important 
factor in the drop of maize exports from an average of twenty 
one percent of the total pre-war export value, to less than 
32 
one percent after l94l. 
The condition of Argentine foreign trade remained 
fairly normal until 1940, although Germany completely cur-
' tailed her purchases at the outbreak of war; however, her 
purchases during the first eight months of 1939 were so 
,i 
I' heavy that they exceeded total purchases in Argentina during 
.. 33 
1938. 
The United states became a principal customer of 
Argentine vegetable oils, cheese, casein, hides and wool 
1 during the war. While Brazil became the leading purchaser 
==~=-· -=#4=-·· ----~=~== -~ .,_- ___ ~··=~·~·~~-- --~---=-~-=== 
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of wheat, Britain monopolized the meat trade. Although 
Argentina was an importer of vegetable oils in peacetime, 
her exports of sunflower seed, peanuts and vegetable oils 
,., 
I! became important during the war. 
i 
' ,, 
II 
II 
:' 
Maize. In every year of World War II except 1943, 
maize production exceeded the pre-war level, and reached 
' record proportions during 1940-42. Despite the fact that 
exports of maize fell heavily, farmers did not diminish 
the acreage sown to maize. Although rnaize is used as food 
,, to a certain extent in Argentina, its foremost use is for 
II 
!' 
seed and animal feed. In 1943 there was an acute drought, 
and due to increased requirements at home, Argentina was 
able to offer only small quantities of maize for export; 
nevertheless a large part of the 1944 crop surplus could 
i not be exported due to the shipping shortage. Maize was 
i; used to feed for the hog industry, and also a fuel, when 
!· 
I,.J•_j 
the reduction of petroleum and coal imports created a fuel 
crisis in the country's industrial and transportation facil-
ities. 
Maize prices on the Buenos Aires market began to 
II drop in 1940 as a direct resu:Lt of the decline in maize 
i', exports, and in order to protect maize producers from heavy 
li losses, the Government arranged to grant credit, through the 
.. i, Banco de la Nacion, when the harvest started. 
il il In .rune,. 1943, a new government took control in Argentina, ', 
\
1
1 and completely revamped the previous agricultural policy. It 
·.·~·-1==·=~·==·--~·- ---~-·--~····· ········=~~ '*"·--·~-~= 
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1 guaranteed a higher minimum price ror 1944 crop maize, and 
requested that producers increase the acreage sown to maize. 
In May, 1944, the Government raised the minimum price again, 
but in September or that year the Ministry or Agriculture 
announced that the Government would no longer purchase maize, 
since producers had ample time to dispose of their stocks 
to the Government purchasing bureau, during the period from 
34 
I september to May. 
At the end of 1940, the Grain Regulating Board was 
authorized to dispose of its stocks in any manner considered, 
desirable; thus, quantities of maize were used for food-
relief, as animal feed, for distillation of alcohol, as fuel 
for transportation and industry. Of all these uses, fuel 
consumed the largest quantity of maize. 
In order to sustain the agricultural economy, the Grain 
Regulating Board sold maize for domestic use at prices much 
lower than it paid to growers. Despite these uses of maize 
as feed to expand the hog industry, and as fuel for industrial 
and transportation purposes, much of the maize rotted due to 
lack of adequate storage facilities. 
Wheat. rn 1935-39 wheat exports totaled 3.2 million 
tons, or half or the Argentine production. Mostly as grain, 
but partly in the form of flour, wheat (Argentina's second 
most important pre-war export crop) comprised seventeen per-
35 
cent of the total export value of the country. 
Wheat production declined very little during the war, 
-35-
!! although exports fell to four-fifths of pre-war levels; the 
result was that surpluses acaumulated which had to be stored 
or used domestically. At the outbreak of war, Argentina 
had a large wheat surplus from the abundant 1938 harvest. 
During the early weeks of the war, wheat exports to Europe 
· fell due to shipping shortages, but they rose sharply 
later, causing the 1939 total to rise above the 1936-38 
level. In 1943 wheat exports amounted to about two-thirds 
of pre-war volume, and in 1941-44 to about eighty percent 
of pre-war volume. Although wheat shipments to Europe 
fell very heavily, the 1944 shipments to Brazil exceeded 
pre-war shipments by twenty five percent. In 1944 wheat 
surpluses for domestic use totaled nine million tons, in 
comparison to the pre-war domestic surplus of four million 
tons. In order to safeguard the economic position of wheat 
growers due to extra-heavy stocks, the Government set mini-
mum prices to producers, bought the wheat from the farmers, 
1
, and sold it in domestic and foreign markets. While the 
Government's ·buying price for wheat for export was slight-
ly above its selling price in 1941-421 the selling price 
surpassed the purchase price, so that in July, 19441 the 
Government bought wheat at 6.75 pesos and sold it at 12.50 
pesos. Since the storage of wheat presented a difficult 
problem, it was used as fuel and feed; however, only 700 1 000 
!I 
" 11 tons of the original two million tons of wheat originally 
II earmarked as fuel were so used, probably since maize is a 
'I 
:i 
=-=-:c:-:c-=- -n~· 
I'· 
-36-
--~-- ·-- o_:_-. .,....-_~!.-o-,-_--:;: o: ··:,·--c:--·:-,.-_-...,- .. c~o~~--:---~=--~ ---::--::-;-_~,~~~ ··- ·· 
I] 
i' 
', better fuel than wheat. 
,, 
' 
" I' 
I 
In 1944 approximately 400,000 tons of wheat were 
v:...;: 
i' written off as "loss by accident ••• and unfit for consumption 11 , 
:r 
due to inadequate storage facilities. · Apparently uses as fuel 
and animal feed could not decrease the surpluses measurably, 
for about five million tons of wheat surpluses from old crops 
36 
remained at the end of 1944. 
Oilseeds. The United states Government, acting on 
j, 
1! behalf of the United Nations, agreed to buy the exportable 
i: 
11 surpluses of sunflower seed oil and peanuts of the 1944 
!I Argentine harvests. Therefore, partly as a result of this 
I' 
:1 action of the United States, and partly due to the fact 
that the Argentine Government guaranteed prices to growers 
in advance of plantings, record acreages and crops of sun-
flower seed and peanuts were obtained in 1944. 
Of the principal oilseeds grown in Argentina (linseed, 
' sunflower seed, peanuts, rapeseed and cottonseed) 1 linseed 
1 
is by far the most important; by 1935-39, sunflower seed was 
second in production volume. During World War II, under 
pressure of foreign and domestic demand for·sunflower seed 
oil, Argentina expanded the area sown to sunflower seed until, 
in 1944, it was seven time.s the pre-war average; as a result, 
il the output of sunflower seed oil was greatly expanded. In 
li 
-. ii, 1944 Argentina's sunflower seed production totaled more than 
r ' 'I one million tons, as compared with an annual average of 
~ .. J~~~~.::;7:~o::g ,::~-::; .:::2 ,:h:~::~::: ::::.::l of -~ 
,, 
,, 
'I 
use as fuel oil in 1943 and 1944, exports in that year 
dropped to 275,000 tons, or leas than half the amount exported 
in 1943. As opposed to the previous heavy flaxseed stocks, 
the situation changed so that prohibition of exports was 
ii dropped in November, 1944. 
1: 
:•1 
I, 
sunflower seed oil. 
---
While the war greatly increased 
production of sunflower seed, it diminished linseed production 
\· to a certain extent. Due to the loss of Europe as a market 
!I 
, and lack of shipping facilities, the pre-war heavy exports 
il of linseed fell drastically. The area sown to linseed was 
II also curtailed after 1940 (in 1944 it we.a about twenty five 
(1, percent below the pre-we.r average), so that large surpluses 
!I il 
i•, would not accunmle.te; but because yields were larger than 
I 
(· during the five years prior to the war, linseed production 
~~~ declined proportionally leas than the area. 
" The area sown to sunflower seed was so rapidly expanded I' 
i,i, 
'I ii that in 1942 the Government, anticipating a record harvest, 
I 
i. set e. "provisional price" for growers, and purchased sunflower 
II 
I! 
1
; seed on the condition that farmers cut the e.ree. of the next 
II 
!i planting by thirty percent, and use the available area for 
I ,I_ 
!, maize, linseed and wheat. 
li 
Because of drought in 1943 causing 
I! great loss to the sunflower seed crop (thus endangering 
" 
\i domestic supplies) 1 exporters of all oilaeeda and edible 
,I 
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]', vegetable oils were prohibited from exporting these i terns • 
' 
1, Due to the failure of the 1943 crop, and in accordance with the 
!i 
i new government policy, the Ministry of Agriculture requested 
~ i 
I[ growers to increase their sunflower crops for 1944. It also 
,, 
:' guaranteed them a minimum price which was three pesos per 
II 
,i quintal more than they received in 1941-43. As a result of ,, 
ii 
11 this request and.the highly remunerative price, the area sown 
,, 
to sunflower seed more than doubled. 
Due to the pressure of foreign sales contracts and of 
il an excellent crop outlook, the price of linseed dropped from 
I 
15.06 pesos per quintal in June, 1940, to 8,76 pesos in 
, october, In November, 19401 the Government announced that it ,, 
:I would set a minirium price of 9,25 pesos per quintal for the 
,, 
i: new crop, in order to protect linseed growers, The Government 
:,1, 
i kept this min:I.Jm.un price until December, 1943, at which time 
:; 38 
!lit raised the price to twelve pesos. 
I! 
:: 
jl Grain Regulating Board. The Grain Regulating Board, 
IIi having authority to regulate linseed prices for export as 
" {i 
11 well as for domestic sales, bought linseed from producers and 
L 
li sold it domestically as well as in foreign markets, The 
:I Grain Regulating Board changed its prices several times during 
1: . 
·, 
1! the war, but export prices always were higher than the prices 
,! 
[i paid to growers; in 1943 and 1944, export prices were double 
·I 
lithe minimum. ,, until september, 1944, one could legally export 
I [I only linseed purchased from the Board, but in that month, 
=~is~~estr:tct:~:,~s __ remov~!_but linseed ex~-~~t~~ had __ to ~ay =-~c=-~= 
II 
i! 
If j, 
'i 
-39-
=~~,,=~t,~='' -=-,-~-~ '-~~-==,=-' --"- -=-=== 
1: 
H 
,, the Government the difference between the basic linseed price 
:I 
I, of 9.25 pesos per quintal, and the export price set by the 
'I I, 
1: Board. 
I 
::
1 
As a result, Argentine 
linseed oil at the end 
i 
of 1942. Table IV (see page 41) 
' 
'I sUllllllB.rizes, for the years indicated, the linseed situation in 
'I 
IJ Argentina. 
1 In 1943, domestic consumption of linseed reached 1.2 ,: 
1: million tons, in comparison to the quantity of 200,000 tons 
!i i: used in normal times. The Grain Regulating Board sold 
'I'• 
II 723,884 tons of linseed for crushing into oil during the first 
r eight months of 1944, and for the balance of 1944, the use of 
I 
j linseed oil as fuel continued at approximately 100,000 tons 
! 
I monthly. 
,, r_ -~~- -=~==-#c,, 
il 
I 
!i 
" 
The linseed crushing industry grew chiefly as a result 
II 
j! of domestic need for a substitute fuel for coal and petroleum, 
!I and secondarily due to demand from abroad. As a result the 
!; output of linseed oil expanded greatly during the war, as 
II 
I 
.I did the area and output of peanuts. 
j! 
!' Under normal peacetime conditions the oilseed exports, 
li particularly linseed, far exceed exports of vegetable oils. 
f, -
ii During 1935-39, the total export value of oilseeds averaged 
II 
!~ 215 million pesos, or about thirteen percent of the total 
il 
1
1 
value of Argentine exports. vegetable oil exports accounted 
I! 
!! for only 250,000 pesos of this total export value of 215 mil-
lion pesos. Prior to the war, Argentina was a net importer 
1' of vegetable oils. 
' I 
I 
. The war stimulated Argentine exports of vegetable oils, 
. I II 
•I 
11 thus completely reversing the situation. From 1942 to 1945 
II 
I' 
! vegetable oil exports averaged 100,000 to 125,000 tons 
;I I: annually; these amounts include cottonseed oil and rapeseed 
:· oil. 
Although Argentina has had a consistently rapid indus-
I' 
1: trial growth during the last decade, her economy is predomi-
·1 
11 nantly agricultural and pastoral, due to her rich, fertile 
i farm land. 
1! 
All grain for export was required to be purchased from 
f"tt I! the Grain Regulating Board; if it was bought in the free mar-
l! 
i' ket, an export fee equal to the difference between the world 
!market price and the Board's price to growers was to be paid. 
=·~~ . ~~~~-=~· ,,._ .~ ,-,~==~~~=·~·~·=~=== 
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TABLE rl 
LINSEED PROWCTION, EXPORTS AND SUPPLIES, 
IN THOUSANDS OF TONS, 1940-44 
CARRYOVER TOTAL SUPPLY FOR 
YEAR_ PROWCTION DECEMBER l SUPPLY EXPORTS DO!EESTIC USE 
1940 1,080 200 1,280 770 510 
1941 1,720 350 2,070 695 1,375 
1942 1,600 846 2,446 420 2,026 
1943 1,348 1,727 3,075 757 2,318 
1944 1,573 1,092 2,665 354 2,311 
source: Pavel P. Egoroff, Argentina's Agricultural Exports 
During world War II, War-Peace Pamphlet Number 8, 
Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 
california 
November, 1945, p. 23. 
'I 
!I 
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Thus the Grain Regulating Board was becoming a virtual govern-
ment export monoply. Many dealers refused to sell at the low 
'I 
,, prices paid by the Board, and took a holding position, thus 
:! 39 
'i 
I! 
:: 
complicating the Government•s program. 
The Grain Regulating Board's purpose was merely to 
subsidize cereal producers at a time when the world grain 
market was in a very depressed condition; it controlled the 
sales of wheat for export only when such control vms neces-
sary, so that heavy forced sales of wheat by private exporters 
would not cause a further downward trend of the World grain 
40 
prices. 
In order to show the Grain Regulating Board r s policy 
of non-interference in the normal market play of grains, we 
offer the following example of its operation in 1934: the 
:: ii Grain Regulating Board was to purchase, exclusively for 
'i !. 
1: export, wheat, maize and linseed in any quantities offered 
I 
to it by producers. The basic purchase prices it set for these 
commodities in 100-kilo lots were 5.75, 4.40 and 11.50 pesos 
respectively. Any losses resulting from sales at world market 
prices below these basic prices would be debited to the 
"profits" of the exchange margin fund. Since wheat was selling 
at below 5.75 pesos per 100 kilos, the Board continued to 
purchase wheat at this price. However, maize and linseed 
prices soon rose to 4.40 and 12.02 pesos per 100 kilos 
respectively, and the Board proved its policy of non-interfer-
ence in normal trade conditions by relinquishing its control 
- ': :__· 
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of maize and linseed marketing to private channels. 
During the period 1934-38 when production and exports 
of agricultural commodities followed an upward trend after 
rising from the depths of the Great Depression, the Grain 
Regulating Board went quietly into the background, and did 
not intervene in any way, with respect to the agricultural 
economy, since grain prices were now acceptable, and sales 
in foreign markets were being consummated at prices which 
reimbursed the farmer in good terms for his efforts and 
financial risks. 
The Grain Regulating Board remained as a very insignifi-
l', cant agency in the Argentine Government until late in 1939, 
II when World War II caused the great shipping shortage which 
out Argentine farmers off from their foreing markets; again 
the Grain Regulating Board stepped in to aid Argentine 
li agriculture in marketing its products. 
;I 
The statistics in Table V (see page ) , furnished by 
II the Banco central de la Repil.blica Argentina, Department of 
I' 
1
j Economic Research, give us the agricultural exports of 
I' Argentina, in tons, from 1940 through 1945. 
! 
li To conclude this brief study of production and export 
1 development during World War II, we may summarily compare 
11 the value figures of the three immediate pre-war years with 
II 
:1 those obts~-'1ing during the war period, as listed in Table VI 
II (see page .. ·· ) • . 
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II 1940 
II 1941 
I
I 1942 
1
1 1943 
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1944 
1945 
TABLE V 
EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN TONS, 1940-45 
CANARY 
V/HE.I>.T MAIZE LINSEED OATS BARLEY SEED 
.. 
3,300,000 1,900,000 752,000 ---11 ---11 ---# 
2,389,673 553,099 664,716 105,866 88,330 13,595 
RYE TOTAL 
---fl 111// 
32,'798 3,848,077 
:I 
:I 
I 
II 
I 
2,176,189 219,859 315,107 13,552 75,403 8,105 4,085 2,812,300 ! 
1,955,147 190,408 646,489 59,017 38,021 4,294 7,157 2,900,933 ~ 
2,326,172 
2,357,302 
549,591 
571,686 
# Figure not available. 
275,191 63,580 
134,631 82,297 
145,283 7,717 3,852 3,371,386 
267,229 7,416 146,780 3,567,341 
" Source: Department of Economic Research, Banco Central de la Republica Argentin~ 
Boletin Estadistico Number 106, L'ay, 1946, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
par;e 67. 
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TABLE VI 
VAIUES OF VARIOUS FARM EXPORTS, IN MILLIONS OF PESOS, 
1937-45 
WHEAT MAIZE FLAXSEED LINSEED OIL 
475.5 598.5 275.3 less than 50,000 
pesos 
183 •. 4 180.5 181.2 less than 50,000 
pesos 
274.5 202.6 170.2 0.1 
283.6 85.3 119.2 3.4 
157.1 21.9 67.1 5.9 
159.4 9.4 56.0 24.1 
162.5 14.8 156.7 28.9 
251.3 43.2 70.4 22.0 
330.6 59.1 29.7 32.0 
ji Source: 
!\ 
Recent Developments in~ Foreign T~ ~Argentina, 
" d 1950, United States Tariff Commission, Washington, D.c. 
·I 
':I 
\', 
TC 1.22: Ar 3, p. lB. 
• 
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General export situation toward ~ of World War II. 
During the late war years the Argentine economy was 
characterized by a trend toward infla ti. on 1 mounting exports, 
a alight improvement in the import situation, accelerated 
domestic business, and continued industrial expansion. The 
export balance of trade in 1944 rose to the highest amount 
recorded in Argentine commercial history. The 1945 balance 
was almost as great, though below the record figure due to 
a big increase in imports. 
Despite the fact that imports into Argentina from 
Europe and the United States were reduced, Argentine exports 
grew during the war, due to United Nations' needs for 
'' foodstuffs, as well as the new Latin American markets for 
;I Argentine industrial products. In 1945 this situation was 
1: 
somewhat altered; former European trade partners resumed 
their business with Argentina in quantity. While the 
scarcity of imports eased somewhat, exports continued at 
42 
high levels. 
In 1944 and 1945 1 total Argentine imports and exports 
grew in value. England was the leading purchaser of Argen-. 
tine goods in each year, although she bought much less than 
in 19431 due to the decline in meat shipments. The united 
states was second in both years. In 1945, Argentine meat 
shipments declined, while grains, principally wheat, were 
exported in increasing amounts. Improvement in grain 
:I prices and exports, except in the case of flaxseed, were 
'I 
'I 
::.="":"=~::----:~ --------- :o-_- --~ - - --= c_--;;c----=-=:=---::o-..: ~:-c:=--:-:-=-::-=-~--::=----
-47-
realized in 1945. These crops suffered from drought and 
locusts in 19451 and large quantities were burned as fuel 
substitutes due to short fuel supplies. 
At the close of World war II1 grain tended to dominate 
foreign trade again; maize was the most important export 
crop in the inter-war years. It represented about one-fifth 
of the value of all exports during 1935-391 and wheat 
represented just a little less. Farming was the dominant 
economic enterprise in Argentina. Although interest in 
industrialization was increasing 1 farm products served as 
43 
the major raw materials of industry. 
condition of ll,gricultural economy after World War ll· 
All in all1 exports during 1940-46 were seriously 
affected by World War II 1 especially exports of certain 
grains 1 such as maize, which due to the scarcity of shipping 
11 space, could not be exported in volume. Thus the emphasis was . 
'
1 laid on those crops more usable domestically, and salable at 
:1 home for consumption and for industrial purposes. 
We may conclude that there were no hindrances or obstacles 
to production placed on farmers by the Government; on the 
contrary1 the Grain Regulating Board, during World war II, 
1 controlled export sales of grain only in order to maintain 
!l minimum domestic and export prices, with the aim of having 
II 
;: the farmer avoid losses. ,, It tended to orient production 
!! 
!I toward those grains from which 
il best financial return, as well 
=--=-:=-- - ~--::-:::.F==----~ ..::::--=-=--- -
the farmer might secure the 
as those grains which the 
domestic economy might, for example, use as fuel or raw 
materials, since it was cut off from those imported fuels it 
might normally use. 
We have seen how Argentina, suffering enormous set-
li backs of the Great Depression, in the late nineteen-thirties 
,1,1 again became one of the largest producers and exporters of 
agricultural commodities. We have also seen that in that 
recovery, the Grain Regulating Board and government policies 
aided an orderly process of expansion and maintenance of 
minimum prices. That movement toward agricultural prosperity 
was stunted by world war II, as would be expected, for the 
aforementioned reasons. 
Despite the setbacks in exporting as a result of World 
1
! War II, and the large unsalable surpluses, government policy 
helped maintain high levels of agricultural activity, the 
highest compatible with the absorptive capacities of the 
domestic economy and the international market. In this 
respect we find that there was a clear incentive to diversify 
production: e. g., maize production was discouraged, while 
oilseed production was encouraged; in addition, the Government 
encouraged the use of maize and other grains as fuel. 
In closing this chapter, we may say that the productive 
!I ii capacity of Argentina, as far as agricultural commodities 
I were concerned, was not permanently affected by the inconven-
'1 iences arising out of the war situation. By 1946 Argentina 
I had perhaps a better chance than ever before to regain her 
II =c~~y-~ ''==~~~--~-"•--====,-== ---
11 
II 
II 
----:: . 
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ii outstanding position in the world markets, as a producer and 
!I 
I. exporter of farm products. 
==~ .. ~·=== 
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CHAPTER IV 
1946: CREATION OF !API; 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF PRESIDENT PER6N. 
With the advent of President Peron to power in 1946, 
there came a drastic change in the method of sales of farm 
,i products on the international market, as well as in the 
domestic market, whereby the marketing of these products 
passed from the hands of private enterprise into the control 
of IAPI, the official government trading agency. This event 
was to influence greatly the Argentine agricultural economy, 
especially as regards the production and marketing of grain 
in the period 1946-51. For this reason it appears quite 
convenient to describe the Argentine Institute for the Promo-
tion of International Trade and its policies - internal as 
well as external - start with our analysis of agricultural 
production and expor-ts from 1946 to 1951. 
The initials I. A. P. r. are used to signify the 
Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade, or Insti-
tute para la Promocion del Intercambio. consequently we will 
employ the abbreviated form to refer to the Institute in the 
discussion which follows. 
Historical development of IAPI. According to the 
September 7th, 1946 issue of Foreign commerce weekly, United 
States Department of Commerce publication, "the creation of 
an entity in Argentina to be known as the Argentine Institute 
was authorized by decree-law 
II 
,! 
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#15350, published in the press at Buenos Aires, May 30, 
1946. 11 44 
IAPI 1 s antecedents. Actually an entirely different 
11 IAPI 11 (the Corporation for the Promotion of Trade) had 
existed since October 20, 1941; this agency was replaced by 
the stronger 11 IAPI 11 on May 30, 1946, and its capital of four 
million pesos turned over to IAPI which, under the terms of 
the decree-law, had broad powers to promote industry and 
trade, particularly with respect to foreign trade. It was 
authorized to sell, purchase and transport all types of coods, 
to issue debentures and incur oblications, to promote the 
organization of all types of business firms and acquire their 
stocks, as well as to undertake any financing operations 
which might be necessary to perform these functions, and any 
others connected with trade promotion.45 
IAPI's functions. IAPI was to operate as an a0ency of 
'I 
II the Government of Argentina, subject only to federal jurisdic-
' i!
,! 
tion, and was to purchase, in foreign nations, the supplies 
and goods required by the Argentine Government, for whom it 
was to act abroad on matters concerned with the negotiating 
and fulfillment of commercial agreements. 
Under the terms of the decree, liaison between IAPI and 
the ~ecutive Power of the Nation was to be maintained through 
the Central Bank of Argentina. This and the fact that close 
II 
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financial relations were to be maintained betw een IAPI and 
the Oentral Bank, as provided in the decree, meant that another. 
section of the Argentine economy was added to those already 
closely associated with the Central Bank. 46 
As stated in the preamlille oi' the decree giving IAPI 
all-inclusive powers over domestic and foreign trade, three 
of its most important purposes were: 
1. to coordinate the effort, especially of trade promo-
tion and development, which previously had been 
handled by various Government agencies. 
2. to centralize responsibility and resources, in 
order to render equal service to all enterprises. 
3. to obtain information concerning the international 
market, and report this information to Argentine 
producers, who would use it to regulate their 
production and sales. 
The Government stated that these purposes could best be 
1 achieved by an official government agency having the financial 
standing and authority requisite to take instantaneous action 
whenever an opportunity offered itself, with respect to sales, 
' purchasing and general promotion work. 
As outlined in the decree-law of May 30, 1946, the 
purposes for which IAPI was created were certainly well-inten-
~ tioned, and at first sight appear to reflect the attitude of 
a nation desiring to aid private enterprise in its quest for 
As regards foreign purchases of supplies for !! foreign markets. 
'I ~~=-~-{~~-~0~=~0- -~-=~-=~=~==-~~·=--"=~~ -·-= - .. -- -
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chases for its own needs. With the exception of clauses per-
taining to the purchase and sale of C O!DlllOdi tieS, the trade 
'I 
ii promotion activities of IAPI well be compared to those of il may 
•' 
the United States Department of Co!Dlllerce 's Office of Inter-
I• national Trade, which seeks to stimulate United States foreie;n 
'I 
II 
il 
i\ 
trade, by keeping exporters informed of world market condi-
tions, etc. 
The interpretation and actual carrying-out of the law 
., 
embodying IAPI was a far cry from the seemingly well-intentione~, 
glowing phrases used to describe IAPI's activities. But, let 
I.!, us first of all, examine chronologically the economic and 
i: political conditions when IAPI was created, and up to the 
!', 
f! present time (for IAPI is still in existence at this writing, 
ii although the present economic crisis in Argentina may force 
'I 
1: its demise at any moment). 
'I 
II I! Pre-war government intervention in business negligible. 
I' 
11 Until the creation of IAFI, Argentina was one of' the 
\] few remaining nations whose private ini tia ti ve was all-powerful 
'I 
II (relatively speakine;) and in which government intervention in 
',I ]!business activity was almost nil. Arter the short industrial 
I: boom following World War I, the Institute for Mobilization of 
-~~Bank credits was formed to free the banks from almost irrecover-
i; 
'I able credits, but except for this action of pre serving the 
I, 
====-= ~ b n~ '~uo t=e, tho Gove•=•n t took g>oa~aln•o~o a11o:~::l vet:F ~~~~ ~~ 
I, 
II 
II 
.I 
i! 
;I 
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'' enterprise conditions to prevail; for example, it placed no 
restrictions on business in the hiring and flring of workers, 
;; 
11 or on prices of industrial firms, or groups of firms. After 
;I 
the enormous growth of Argentina's industrial position follow-
ing World War II, the Government's policy of non-intervention 
in business was altered considerably.47 
Post-war ch~nge in official regard to private business. 
Between June 4, 1943 and June 3, 1946, the revolutionary 
governments in control for the most part did not concern them-
selves with this problem, since they did not expect the War 
to end as soon as it did; but these governments sought to make 
!r Argentina independent, or at least to reduce her dependence on 
I 
I I, 
" II 
I! 
II 
imported goods. Thus their aim dove-tailed with native indus-
try's demand for protection. 
Politically the road became clear when the traditional 
opponents of e;overnment intervention, the leaders of commerce 
and agriculture, backed the forces who tried in vain to defeat 
colonel Juan Eer6n at the polls. Colonel Per6n 1 s richt-hand 
man and economic advisor, was Miguel Miranda, a self-made 
;i manufacturer !i who was appointed president of the Argentine 
central Bank on March 26, 1946, when this bank became a 
national institution. Sr. Miranda, together with sr. Maroglio, 
then manager of the Central Bank, shaped Argentine economic 
policy, a policy which was no longer based on 11 laissez-faire 11 , 
1 but on "private initiative within the framework of a state-
~lanned economy.n 48 ==== ~==~~=-=-~~-c=---=~--··=.~~-~=- "--=---= I il 
ii 
il 
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Executive planning in the interest of greater economic 
self-sufficiency was the aim of the new Government. As 
Argentina was naturally self-sufficient in foodstuffs, 
! ,. 
II 
planning appeared to be more necessary in industry. 
The Central Bank: factor in §tate control of foreign 
trade. The Central Bank had full control over all foreign 
exchange transactions, and even had the power to formulate 
regulations regarding these transactions; it was already in 
control of the inflow and outgo of capital. In November 1933, 
Argentina began to control imports purely as a monetary measure, 
but this control soon became an instrument for selecting the 
types of goods that might be ~.ported, as well as the coun-
tries supplying these goods, as sources. Long before 'Norld 
War II, foreign exchange for certain goods produced in the 
United States was frequently unavailable, while imports from 
Europe, especially from England and Germany, were encouraged, 
not only by granting import licenses, but also through 
preferential exchange rates. 
We how have the background as of June, 1946. Argentina, 
swollen with the millions in gold and foreign currencies 
reaped as a money-making neutral during World War II, decided 
to undertake a vast program of national and international 
projects, such as: 
1. lending millions to Peru; Chile,· paraguay and 
other neighbors. 
2. selling wheat and meat on credit to European nations 
--------
.. ---
I 
'I 
II 
'I 
I 
,! 
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which financially were bad risks. 
3. embarking on a program of national i~provement: 
river and road construction, hydro-electric power, 
labor and land reforms, development of industry, 
social security and military defense. 
Despite the vast gold and foreign exchange reserves 
accumulated in the central Bank (even at that time under 
federal supervision) 1 the simultaneous carrying-out of all 
these plans proved too much for Argentine capital reserves 
(not to mention the almost unlimited right of any Argentine 
to import any item of any kind and quantity from any nation 
at just about any price he wished to pay). This import 
situation lasted until the middle-half of 19471 when the 
dollar-drain, due to extra-heavy imports, required the 
imposition of import controls. 
Argentina emerged from World War II with the strongest, 
wealthiest economy in Latin America. The profits of neutrali-
ty stirred a lingering nationalism, dating back to the Great 
Depression, when "Buy Argentine Goods" was the slogan. 
After World war II, industry expanded and controlled 
local markets more closely. There was expected to be a 
seller's msrket for agricultural producer.s. For many years 
in the future, the foreign exchange accumulated during the 
War (over one billion dollars), would offer a weighty bar-
gaining level in dealing with United states and British 
businessmen and government officials. Peron was planning to 
-57-
use all of these assets, financial, industrial and 
agricultural. 
Per.6nts ambitious program. President Perbn had a nation-
alistic program. In his inaugural address, he promised to 
extend secondary education, develop backward areas, aid the 
tenant farmer through land reform, and liberalize labor 
legislation; in addition, he promised to make Argentina 
independent of foreign influence, redeem all foreign debts, 
and strengthen industry, if necessary, through state-aided 
enterprises. Even before Peron took office, it was apparent 
that these political promises would result in basic changes 
49 
in the Argentine economy, even if partly carried out. 
' A month before Peron's inauguration, the Central Bank 
and all bank deposits were nationalized. The central Bank 
acquired vast powers, including fixing rates of interest and 
export permits. The Government argued that nationalization 
was essential to guarantee an orderly expansion of the economy. 
Following nationalization of the central Bank, a state 
Industrial Credit Bank was established with (u.s.) $25 
millions capital, and a national technological institute 
was created to foster independent and scientific research. 
The Government also set up a department of commerce and indus-
try and a National Council for Postwar Social and Economic 
Planning, while abolishing the Argentine Trade Promotion 
I 
I 
I, I 
II 
11 
II 
II 
I 
I 
II 
' li 
I' 
! 
1' 
II 
li 
II 
Corporation in favor of a bank-sponsored trade-promoting agen- I! 
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Thus, the Argentine government, since the days of the 
I 1930-31 depression, more or less controlled its foreign 
I trade, but its control was never so all•reaching as under IAPI. 
I 
i IAPI, therefore, is but one factor in Peron r a general nation-
il alistic policy of making Argentina industrially and financially 
world power, sufficient unto itself. 
Changes in Argentine Financial Status, 1936-46. 
Three notable shifts took place in the Argentine economy 
1936-46: 
I 
I 
i' II 
II 
I! 
1. Argentina changed from a debtor to a creditor nation ,'1 
(as of 1946). . ~~ 
2. Argentine internal debt increased heavily, due to heavy I! 
military spending and an inflationary trend caused by 
a larger, active balanee 1 from 1943-46. 
3. Big improvement in real national income, due to 
increased industrial output. 
Between December, 1941 and December, 1945, Argentina 
, had a substantial net surplus in her balance of payments each 
I year. 
The gold and foreign exchange held by the Central Bank 
,, 
I 
i' ~I 
1: 
,I 
II 
II 
II 
,I 
il 
increased from 1542 million pesos in 1935 to 4673 million pesos II 
in 19451 when there was a gross total of foreign exchange and 'I 
gold of ~1.4 billion dollars, or 5700 million pesos. 
By December, 1946 1 
51 
6010 million pesos. 
the Central Bank•s holdings rose to 
Argentina was never in a stronger position financially 
li 
jl 
II 
i', 
'I 
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vis-a-via the outside world than during the ~er of 1946. 
Prosperity rose steadily in Argentina from 1936-46. 
Peron's Five-Year Plan. 
In January of 1947, President Peron presented a five-
year plan to the Argentine Congress, calling for expenditures 
of about u.s. $1,600,000,000 on a vast reorganization and 
development of Argentine economy. The basic features of the 
1 plan included land reform, inm:tigration of 2501 000 foreigners, 
improvement of labor conditions, social legislation, housing, 
development of natural resources, (such as hydro-electric 
power, fisheries, forests), etc. 
Peron described the plan as essentially social in charac-
ter, designed to place Argentine economic wealth at the 
service of all Argentines (one of the tenets of Latin American 
political philosophy, first promulgated in the Mexican Con-
stitution of 1917), so that every citizen might benefit from 
Argentine wealth in proportion to his capacity and efforts 
toward the public good. 
The scope and cost of the project left many an Argentine 
breathless, and there was, at the time, considerable appre-
1 hension over the concentration of power in the Executive Plan; 
II ji supporters, however, saw it as a chance to expand Argentina's 
I I wartime-accumulated wealth on national development. Peron 
' described the plan as a counter~easure against deflation, 
which would come in a year or so. 
I 
t 
-60-
Source of Funds for Five-Year Plan. 
To finance this ambitious program, not to mention loans 
to neighboring states and military defense, Argentina banked 
on its policy of selling its farm products at prices several 
times the current world market price, through IAPI. Basi-
cally, Miguel Miranda, head of IAPI, and Peron's right-hand 
economic counselor, planned to make the most of the seller's 
market in wheat and meat, in 1946 and 19471 be getting as 
high a price as foreign nations would pay. 
Small wonder, then, that the United States Government 
(previously angry due to the harboring of Axis agents in 
Argentina, not to mention its non-cooperative attitude in 
World War II) should take offense when she herself was dis-
tributing relief supplies throughU.N.R.R.A. gratis to 
stricken nations, while Argentina profiteered. 
~o~p~p~o~s~i~t~i~o~n _o_f Farmers _t_o IAPI's Sales Policies. 
To offer an example of IAPI's methods, IAPI was paying 
u.s. $1.10 per bushel to Argentine farmers for wheat and 
sold it at u.s. $4.85 per bushel overseas. This was a step 
in the wrong direction, not only as regards Argentine repu-
tation with the family of nations, but also with respect to 
traditions of free trade, held dear by Argentine farmers. As 
this s±tuation grew more clear to the farmers, they began 
j cutting down on their crops so as to thwart IAPI as llUlCh as 
possible, and today, they stand as one of the chief economic 
groups opposing IAPI. 
II 
II 
I ,, 
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Promulgation of Official Policy on IAPI. 
On November 4, 1948, in a speech at Buenos Aires, 
Admiral Teisare, a prominent Argentine Government official, 
offered a typical example of the Government's 11 get-rich-quick11 
sales tactics through IAPI's sale of linseed oil at above-
market prices: 
With a view to consolidating the doctrine of economic 
independence, the new constitution should provide that 
import of essential goods, export of surplus production, 
the organization of manufacturing, transport and dis-
tribution of Argentine wealth abroad, is to be a 
prerogative of the state, Other manifestations of the 
country's economy will be left to private enterprise, 
but public utility services must be exclusively 
Argentine,52 
Unfavorable Results of state Control of Foreign Trade, 
To a great extent, the Government monopolized the 
export-import trade through IAPI's control, but great contro-
versies arose as a result of this proposal to give IAPI 
constitutional control, and protests were lodged not only by 
opposing political parties, but by financial and economical 
interests. A Buenos Aires financial journal, in a leading 
article, stated that the former liberal government was accused 
of conniving to waste Argentine resources in dividends, 
j commission, freight, and .. other charges; nevertheless under 
j it, Argentine prosperity :reached a point comparing favorably 
' 53 
'with other countries, 
It also said IAPI's intervention in Argentine foreign 
' 
ltrade has not always served the best interests of Argentina; 
e.g. the foreign sales' (by IAPI) of linseed and linseed o;tl, 
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for which IAPI asked a price four times higher than the 
current world market price, and incidentally, four times 
higher than the price paid to the Argentine producer. The 
result was that the United States, which for years bought 
one half of Argentina's production of linseed, was induced 
to encourage domestic production, and the first United states 
crop harvested exceeded ita requirements, closing this 
important market and resulting in an estimated loss of 
2501 000,000 pesos to Argentina. 
IAPI also made other errors in the international r~rket. 
Since the end of 'Norld War II, Argentine exports have been 
based on the belief that decreased production and world 
shortages of raw materials would force buyers to pay any 
price the seller might ask. This seems logical enough, for 
Argentines demonstrated this point in their buying activities 
abroad; starved for manufactured goods throughout World War 
II, they paid about any price asked by United states exporters 
on manufactured goods in our "export heyday", 1946-47. 
It is now evident that this trade policy, however 
profitable in the days of shortage, is very shortsighted. At 
a time when Argentina more than ever needs foreign exchange, 
especially dollars, most exports have shown a marked decline, 
and the Government has at last taken note of this. 
Sharp Drop in Exports of~ Products. 
A privately-published Buenos Aires economic weekly, in 
a 1948 issue, referred to the drop in hides exports, as well 
II 
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j- as those of meats and--~::in,- an~ the- virtual stoppage of 
I 
! linseed oil exports. It said that import permits were being 
fl\ granted very grudgingly, and even those importers who suc-
ceeded in obtaining quotas for textiles from Britain, e.g., 
often found it impossible to secure exchange so that they 
might make payment in sterling currency. This journal 
believed that the Government must either lower export prices 
on many products, or adjust official rates for foreign ex-
change, so that prices paid by overseas buyers would fall, 
with no corresponding decrease of the peso equivalent. It 
suggested that the Government might adjust the official 
rates of exchange, but the statements of IAPI's boss, Senor 
54 
Miguel l'!.iranda, hardly confirmed this conjecture. 
Official Arguments in Favor of IAPI's Price Policies. 
In an address to the Finance Ministers of Argentine 
Provincial Governments, November 25 1 1948, Senor Miranda 
stated he believed that it would soon by necessary to reduce 
cereal prices for export, but that it should be possible, 
by astute bargaining, to obtain higher prices for meat, hides 
and wool. He said that if Belgium, for example, wished to 
• 
1 
sell rails to Argentina at prices 50% higher than those asked 
by the United sta c;es, and in exchange wanted to buy Argentine 
wheat, Argentina would demand 50%' more for its wheat (but 50%' 
more than what price was not specified). Referring to imports 
of British coal, he said that as prices demanded were four 
times the pre-war figure, why shouldn•t Argentina demand a 
----- ---~~~~ 
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price for its meat four times that formerly obtained? These 
remarks by Peron's economic lieutenant were, of course, 
I merely variations on a theme which he and other Argentine 
II Government spokesmen have harped upon for years. 
II 
II 
II 
d 
Suspension of Publication of Foreic,n Trade statistics. 
The drop in Argentine foreing trade w·as accompanied 
by suspension of, or at least delay in publication of official 
statistics. The foreign trade figures for the period January 
to June, 1948, were published in August, 1948. The central 
Bank's Bulletin (published monthly) appeared in August, 1948, 
and contained data, up to the end of July, 1948, Ylhether 
this interruption in the issue of these figures is deliberate 
or not is a matter of conjecture; however, it seems evident 
that the Government probably is unwilling to publish its trade 
statistics, as it might be placed in a bad light, 
United States' disapproval of IAPI found a response from 
certain segments of the Argentine population who received no 
benefits from IAPI's transactions, and who long suspected 
that not all the profits were being used to public advantage. 
' This joint disapproval forced Peron to publish the first 
balance sheet since IAPI was established in May, 1946, The 
document shows that IAPI received considerable loans from 
government banks and that itsoutstanding debt totaled more than 
three billion pesos. At the same time, the balance sheet 
claimed that IAPI made a two billion peso profit in the 
calendar year ending September 30, 1948. on the assets scale 
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I' there was a substantial item of l~ billion pesos in the form 55 
I 
.I 
I 
I! 
;I 
ill of government securities. .1 
These figures suggest that IAPI is more than a r.1ere I, 1
1! 
I' 
:I 
I ~ 
I 
II trading company and in fact had become pa1•t of the Government's!! 
I: 
I 
I 
financial machine. 
Official Reasons for Creation and r.:aintainance of IAPI. 
'i Let us now look at IAPI and its "raisons dretre" from 
I 
'I I. 
II 
,, 
~~~ Peron's point of view. In a speech delivered May 3, 1948, as 
1! a reply to the National Foreign Trade council (a United states , 
I 
I 
businessmen's organization), Senor Miguel Miranda, Peron's 
former head of IAPI, vigorously defended Argentine state 
trading policies which were nru.ch criticized in a report of the 
United States National Foreign Trade Council published in 
Buenos Aires. He said tbat as long as other countries have 
' their IAPIS in disguised forms, IAPI would have to continue, 
though he personally would just as much like to see trade 
56 
revert to private channels as NFTC suggests. 
ltliranda said that IAPI was formed expressly to defend 
the Argentine economy against buyers' organizations like the 
II 
1 International Food council. He said that the first linseed 
1'1 contract signed with the Council was at a fair price -- because 
I it was the same as the cost of production in the buying 
countries: 
Before IAPI started, we got 93 pesos per hundred kilos 
of linseed, and afterwards 83 pesos ••••••• producers 
in Britain, United states, Canada and India are assured 
74.41, 79.32, 52.89, and 79.92, respectively. Present 
United states market prices are above the guaranteed 
-_--=_:_----:-:::---o-·-- ~-o:----------== -- -
' ,, 
i'l 
'I 
II 
II 
il 
li 
li 
I' 
j! 
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i! ,, 
,. price ••••• would it not be more 
National Foreign Trade council 
States Government to leave the 
private enterprise, instead of 
tion to us?57 
practical that the 
recommend the United 
linseed business to 
making that recommends-
Miranda, answering charges that Argentina had lost two 
billion pesos in gold and exchange during 1947, said: 
11For every dollar earned in war years we burned up four in 
ii 
:1 wear and tear on equipment, which explains why, when the 
I, moment came when we could replace, reserves went down verti-
1[ cally." He said that IAPI enabled the country to get prices 
for its products equivalent to new high prices charged for 
equipment, so that exports were valued in 1947~ 5,332,000,000 
:,1 pesos against 1,700,000,000 in 1938-39. 11 What would have 
:I 
li happened if IAPI had not interfered, leaving exports to normal 
1\ 
,, channels? Simply chaos.rr58 
Criticizing NFTC r s references to IAPI' s imports, Miranda 
:
1 
said that perhaps NFTC thought it unnecessary that Argentina 
I 
'' should buy locomotives to replace wastage during the war, "to 
, supply your British allies with food and munitions. 11 He said 
' that evidently NFTC thought it unncessary to buy trucks to 
haul crops to the ports for a hungry world, 11which allowed us 
to raise food exports from a half million tons to 1,200,000 
':monthly." He defended the repatriation of foreign debt as 
' ' 
" saving exchange; likewise the purchase of a merchant fleet 
I' 
·: "after the penurious experience of two wars" 1 and saving 
I, 
.· freights. He asked where capital was better off, since it 
I' 
11 en joyed a stable government with popular support, and low taxes. =-"-~=1-.. ~~-.. =~- .. -= .. --.. ,, 
,, 
I 
:I 
i! 
II, 
=====-------
---------------.. 
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Eiranda, defending IAPI, cited other countries' organiza-
tions, such as the International Food Council, the Inter-
:i 
:i national 'ifueat Agreement, 11 India' s JUte Control, which fixes 
!, ,, 
il 
!\ ,, 
i! 
ii 
1,'1 
II 
II 
,I 
,I 
'i I, 
I 
I 
quotas for all consuming nations but Argentina." 
He said therefore, that he was an ardent an exponent 
of free enterprise as anyone. As long as these conditions 
existed, it was not possible to de-control Argentine foreign 
trade: 
Our President has said that Argentina is ready to 
deal with all the world on equality of conditions. 
This means concretely that for Argentina to return 
the trading of her PTOduction to normal channels, 
other countries must do the same -- United states in 
first place because at this time she is the greatest 
producer. I think that we may know each other more 
and understand each other better.59 
(,, Comparison of IAPI !£ other nations' control .££ foreign 
II 
·1 trade. As regards Miranda's first point that other nations 
l1 have their IAPI' s (i.e., import and export controls), one 
II must readily agree. All nations maintain control over their 
r: 
·!foreign trade operations, but in the case of Argentina, it 
li 
flamounted to an actual taking-over and operation of foreign 
i,!, trade 'oy 
,, the Argentine Government, as a government function. 
I! Second, Miranda stated that IAPI was formed to defend 
'I Argentina's economy against buyers' organizations such as the 
'I! International Food Council, which as a result of large volume 
lj purchases, feels entitled to at least moderate, if not rather 
I. 
t: 
'i low price quotations. Naturally, organizations of this type 
would be a thorn in the side of an Argentina which is seeking 
to obtain the highest world prices for its available food 
====~~=======··=·=··=·=============== .--===== 
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/I 
'i supplies, and so we may agree with Miranda on the reason for 
IAPI's creation. 
IAPI's purchases: study in waste. and corruption. 
As for the great amount of money spent by IAPI in 
,, 
i' the United States on industrial machinery replacements and 
i i; military equipment (bought with high profits reaped by IAPI 
ii on exports), we must sympathize with Argentina. For a period 
jj of two years following World War II, IAPI' s purchasing agents 
n 
were buying almost any piece of surplus war equipment offered 
to them, and paying practically any price asked; to support 
these wasteful purchases (most of this equipment is now 
rusting in Buenos Aires, and will soon be sold as scrap), 
'I IAPI was forced to charge very high prices. Yet despite 
I 
I IAPI's enormous profits, Argentina's reserves still diminished 
\!by 2,ooo,ooo,ooo gold pesos in 1947. Hov1ever, as Miranda 
'I stated, a large portion of imports were spent for vital, use-
1 
' 
! ful replacements, such as locomotives, and these purchases, if 
I 60 
11 priced right, were certainly justifiable. 
The "Linseed" Mis oa lcula tion. 
We may also read between the lines to notice how sensitive 
hiiranda felt regarding the linse·ed situation. By charging 
!I 
1
1 
extremely high linseed prices, he caused the United States 
~~Government to subsidize the United States domestic growers, 
'I 
!Who, in their first year, harvested enough to reap an export 
1
surplus, thus losing for Argentina her best linseed customer. 
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, Indeed, Miranda would have been much happier if the United 
States Government ceased domestic linseed subsidies, and 
resumed purchases from Argentina. 
Fallacy of Miranda's "Free Enterp~ise". 
If Eiranda was, as he stated, as ardent an exponent of 
free enterprise as anyone, he expressed this quality very 
strangely. He stated that Argentina would deal with the world 
only on equal conditions, and that if other nations would 
remove controls, so would Argentina. But }:1iranda certainly 
' must have realized that no other nation outside of the Soviet ,, 
Union and its satellites has taken over such complete control 
of its foreign trade, all other nations retaining foreign 
trade in the hands of private enterprise. 
Therefore, since this fact was easily available to 
' Miranda (it is perfectly obvious to everyone acquainted 
:'with the facts), we have no alternatige but to assume that 
raranda was ignoring this fact and retaining IAPI for reasons 
other than (or in addition to) those he offered us. 
Financial problems of Peron attributable to IAPI's 
Activities. In a comment appearing in "United states News 
··World Report" 1 March 5, 1948, we find the following interest-
'! ing statement: 
Other troubles are adding themselves to the basic 
difficulty in the country's finances. 
1. Flight of capital is under way. liore and more 
II investors are pulling out of Argentina. ,I 2. Inflation is growing - the cost of living for 
~~~~=--~---~~-=-~ 
1: 
" 
" 
" 
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low income families has more tl~n doubled since 1939. 
3. The 'Peron Plan', designed to make Argentina self-
sufficient and the leading Latin-American nation, is 
getting some blame now for bringing Argentina to its 
present troubles, as it was responsible for tl1e over-
seas spending of the country's financial reserves • 
• • • • in addition, some opponents of Peron say the 
trade agency, despite its low-price policies at 
home, hasn't been able to build up the big profits 
once counted on.61 
we therefore can appreciate, as a result of the above 
article, the adverse conditions of the Argentine economy 
caused by Peron's financial policies. Also apparent is the 
fact that the rperon Planr is being blamed, in some quarters as 
the basic cause of these conditions. 
Among United states farmers and businessl:len, accustor.1ed 
to living in a free economy, IAPI's policies found no popu-
larity. The United States reaction was well expressed in the 
,following comments of the authoritative British economic 
. publication. The Economist, of Sept. 25, 1948: 
••••• Peron and colleagues have suddenly become afraid 
that Washington is using the r,rarsha 11 Plan to check 
various forms of Argentine profiteering in world 
markets. They didn't expect this and looked forward 
to a flow of dollars acquired through offshore pur-
chases for ERP countries • 
••••• so far!. ERP purchases of supplies from Argentina 
total only 1~356,000 worth of supplies for Bizonia. 
Before they agree to increase purchases, United States 
officials appear to suggest that Argentina meet four 
conditions: 
1. Argentine export prices come down to world levels. 
2. Argentina pay in full for what it already bought 
in the United States. 
3. Argentine foreign investment conditions should 
be liberalized. 
4. The United states opposes state trading monopolies 
and says IAPI is often responsible for artificially 
high Argentine prices • 
••••• The weakness of Argentina's current position 
may induce the Government to reach a settlement with 
-71-
the United states. This shouldn't be difficult as 
Washington no longer wishes to overthrow Peron but 
is primarily concerned with increasing the world 
supply of foodstuffs at reasonable prices.62 
Troubles began piling up for General Peron in late 1948. 
These troubles (inflation, and shortages of manufactured goods) 
were making the people grumble, and crippling Pero'n' s plans to 
build Argentina into a great world power. 
!API' s Actions which hurt Argentina. 
Peron's biggest troubles can be traced to some wrong 
guessing. He exacted ~4.85 per bushel for wheat, similar prices 
' for other exports and thought he could do it indefinitely, but 
in 19491 prices of Argentine goods were coming down. Although 
the central Bank had (u.s.) $215 1 000,000 in late 19481 IAPI's 
63 
' debts were twice this amount. 
The ambition to build Argentina into a mighty military 
.... 
and industrial power led Peron to make tl1is gamble of high-
priced agricultural exports being salable perpetually on 
world markets. This ambition was based on the belief that 
, Argentina should become virtually self-sufficient instead of 
exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. 
In order to accomplish this ambitious dream, !API was founded 
• to make all foreign purchases for the billion-dollar Five-Year 
:plan; it was the importing agency for private industries. 
,Through its system of subsidies, it regulates food prices. 
iwhen the British-owned railways were taken over, !API paid for 
!! 
:them. When Franco borrowed (U.s.) Cl25 millions from 
i, 
,. 
=c-.·~cc·c~ · 
" 
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Argentina, IAPI lent him the money. Every private enterprise 
64 
in Argentina was affected by IAPI. 
IAPI's actions which strengthened Argentina. 
But although IAPI is guilt:r of high-handed short-sighted 
11 
I, 
1: policies of waste and corruption, and corner-grocery book-
,, 
keeping, Peron can rightly claim that it did much to lift 
Ar;entina from its old colonial status. Foreigners no 
longer own the railroads or telephones. Foreign "exploiters" 
operate only under great handicaps. The Peronistas defend 
IAPI and its works in terms of this sort of economic emsnci-
pat ion. 
In December 1948, in a fighting speech at santa 
President Peron boasted: 
' Fe, 
In order to cut off the international monopolies at 
the frontiers, I created IAPI. Before, foreign 
trade was done by trusts. Today the Government does 
it, l'Tith the difference that then it was done for 
the trusts' sole benefit, and today the Government 
does it for the people•s benefit. This year, IAPI 
msde C4l8 millions. Before, the trusts made it. 
They are not content, but the people should be.65 
' It is doubtful, however, that Peron was as right as he 
claimed to be when he boasted that he freed Argentina from 
1
, economic and financial plight are proving. 
J.liranda•s Political Demise. 
In January 1949, Senor !Uranda VIas suddenly thrown out 
il of office as IAPI' s head, and his Ha tiona l Economic Council 
ilwas abolished. Two little-h-nown men, Dr. Roberto Antonio 
j: 
1rAres, and Dr. Alfred Gomez r,:orodes, were made Secretary of 
=cc·c--•- -4c-,--=~--==---~ o=~ --~~----- =-~-----== 
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Economy and Finance, respectively. Unlike l.Iiranda, both 
believed that the vtorld market was a buyers' and sellers' 
r..arket, not a sellers' market only. !1liranda got the formal 
66 
title of "technical assessor to the Chief of state". 
Peron's Promises of Liberalizing Trade not Fulfilled, 
And so in early 1949, it appeared that the pendulum was 
swinging in the direction of de-control of Argentine foreign 
trade by the Peron regime, But the Xorean War of mid-1950 as 
yet unforeseen, with its ensuing scramble for foodstuffs and 
raw materials by many nations, caused a repetition of the post-
war control of agricultural exports by IAPI, and the sales 
policy of "as high as the tariff will bear". Peron believed 
that the Korean War would very quickly develop into a full-
scale conflagration between the United states and the Soviet 
:Union, a conflagration which would set him up in a pivotal 
1, position, where he would shift his political weight to 
:• 
'· 
!, Argentina's advanta~;es, as well as achieve his ambitious dreams 
1: 
I: of industrialization and military mechanization through high 
i,! profits realized from >export sales of farm products. Only the 
' localization of the war in Korea prevented the crystallization 
of this mad dreal!'~ 
But no, this was still early 19491 and IJI.PI was pre-
paring to accept world market prices for its backlog of 
200,000 tons of linseed oil, built up as foreign buyers refused 
,I 
i' to pay the high prices demanded. At the same time quebracho 
'!!producers were reportedly authorized to cut their prices and 
li -- --·- ------· -~-~··-=·-·- ~=·-=·==· =- ---=-·=~-=-··1!'-- . ·-- ----
: 
ii 
il 
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! sell their entire production, instead of turning over part 
1 of it to IAPI. These were moves to reduce state intervention 
and to give private enterprise greater freedom in the export 
67 
trade, in an effort to recover lost v1orld marl~ets. 
New Policy of IAPI: Freer Forei~ Trad~. 
The new head of IAPI, Senor Roberto Antonio Ares, stated 
that he was going to return imports to private hands. He 
intended that IAPI continue to sell Argentina's major exports 
(farm commodities), but that it would confine its buying 
generally to rubber, oil, coal and other basic industrial raw 
materials. Compared to the rules oi' !.!iranda, these new rocu-
lations were a concession to private traders. Of course, 
before these new regulations could be tested, the central Bag~ 
v10uld have to get some foreign exchange to facilitate t1•ade. 
1950 Export-Import Bank Loa~: No Cre_dit to 11New 11 IAPI. 
Possibly as a result in the shift of its foreign trade policy, 
there was a remote chance in early 1949 that the Export-Import 
Bank or private United States banks v10uld advance credit to 
Argentina; the Argentine Government also was sounding out the 
World Bank for possible membership. A loan to Argentina fin-
ally was made by the Export-Import Bank in April 1950, in the 
amount of U.s. :;)125 millions, but the reasons for this loan 
were not due to the fact that Argentine foreign trade was 
completely released from official control (for it was not, 
I 
II as was certainly proved when the Korean 
II 
War broke out), but 
=~=c=~=-c~·=~~,~~~~=.=•~ c.•~~c~~=.•~ ~. -~~~•====•~••~ ·~~~•='=~~~··=-
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primarily to aid United States exporters, who had millions of 
dollars worth of goods tied up for several years in Argentina 
due to the dollar shortage; also a slight recession in the 
! United States was predicted for the sumner of 1950, unless the 
economy was bolstered, and this loan was intended to stimulate 
Argentine purchases of United States manufactured goods, so 
as to maintain high levels of production in the united states 
by subsidizing United states exports. The inaction by Presi-
, 
dent Peron in favor of freer Argentine foreign trade, even at 
the low ebb of Argentine exports in early 1950, had very little 
to do with the granting of this loan to Argentina. 
other Aspect~ of Peron's commercial Policies. 
Thus it appears that president Per6n really believed he 
was helpine to ameliorate the condition of the laboring class 
which brought him to power, through control of Argentine 
foreign trade -- for before taking office in 1946, Peron 
' intima ted that development of Argentine economy could not 
f\ 
II il safely remain in the hands of private enterprise, and work for 
lithe advantage of Argentina as a whole. Peron, through IAPI, 
' 
'!iused discriminatory trade practices such as preferential treat-
i! ,, 
l'ment for Argentina• s shipping and insurance firms, bilateralism ,, 
I 
l:and barter. \'/e nru.st, however, consider the fact that the 
,, 
i 
:·Great Depression forced Argentina to adopt restrictive trade 
,! 
ijmeasures, which were 
' 69 
1lbeen set in 1931. 
I: 
,, 
'·' 
1,''.· ----·=~·= 
resumed in 1947, the precedent having 
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With the exception of the United States, Argentina for 
the most part sold its export products to those countries from 
which it could get coal, iron, machinery, arms and vehicles. 
But if the other trading country was unable to ship at once 
,I the goods Argentina needed, IAPI advanced it sizeable credits. 
Besides building up reciprocal trade on a preferential basis, 
1
: this policy gave business to the new Argentine merchant marine, 
favored the growing publishing and movie industries of Buenos 
!1 Aires, procured technical aid and arranged for illlllligra tion to 
under-populated Argentina. 
r.:iranda drove hard bargains in dealing with countries 
asking for Argentine foodstuffs. He justified his high-handed 
r price and payment terms on grounds tr~t historic economic roles 
were reversed, and that Argentina was now merely calling the 
turn that had formerly been called on Argentina. 
IAPI' s 11Enormous 11 Profits, Viewed in Respect to Sales 
i' Terms. In shipping food to Europe on credit, the Government 
ii 
!: claimed that Argentina was straining its resources to the 
I! 
'! limit in the cause of reconstruction, while it had to pay cash 
,, 
! for vital imports. Yet in hard fact, Peron had almost no 
alternative but to supply on credit since Europe couldn't pay, 
and Argentina couldn't afford to let its foodstuffs rot at 
1: home. 
:I 
if of the 
From the debtor governments' point of view, the terms 
I loans were not desirable, as Peron's high food prices 
i' in comparison to those of the United States and canada cut 
ldown the buying powe::__~~-~:~~_edit·~---I=:t, october__l~4?, whi~e __ ~=·:-~= 
=o.::"-::::..":""=-=-- ~~--==-=-=-~-_:·;:;:-...:::::-;:·_- .=.--::oc::.·· ~---=---==----- - ------------- - - .. 
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the wheat price in the United States at the height of a bull 
market was topping ~~3 a bushel, Argentine wheat was reportedly 
selline; for :~5, and some deals were going as high as (1;6. At 
this time, Argentine grain producers were being paid U.s. 
$1.10 a bushel, and IAPI absorbed the difference. But we 
nmst note, in all fairness, that IAPI's high-cost wheat was 
paid for not in dollars but in soft currencies or was taken 
on credit, or reimbursed in exports, frequently prices above 
70 
United states exports~ 
Peron • s !IIisca lcula tion: u. S. Disapprove 1 of IAPI • 
• Peron seems to have counted on the ECA•s dollar off-
shores purchases of Argentine raw materials and foodstuffs 
to cure the Argentine economy weakened by IAPI's high price 
policies. i\Ioreover, he was very sure of these purchases 
since it was assumed that American business interests would 
bring pressure on Washington to bail them out of their diffi-
culties with Argentine exchange controls by supplying ECA 
" dollars to Argentina. But on March 12, 19481 the United states 
congress issued a forceful denunciation of Argentine trade 
practices, charging Peron•s regime with "bleeding a starving 
I 
I I 
,I 
I 
I 
Europe 
may be 
in order that an 
71 
maintained." 
efficient government trading system 
Impoverishmen~ of the Argentine Farmer. 
The following quotation from the New York Times gives us 
-78-
Foreign capital investment in Argentina is turning 
to Africa as a result of the Peron Government 
restrictions, Joshua B. Powers, President of the 
Export Advertizing Club, declared yesterday. Not 
only is Argentina losing dollars which she sorely 
needs, he said, but this noney is being used to 
deprive her of future markets. 
Deprived of a free market for his product, the 
Argentine farmer has become a contract laborer 
without a union to protect him, l.!r. Powers pointed 
out. The state monopoly which was set up to buy 
farm products at a fixed price is supposed to have 
broken up the adverse system under which crops were 
handled, he saic, but the farmer now complains that 
the state is taking two-thirds of the proceeds.72 
' This is a graphic description of the result of Peron's 
agrivultural policies, through which he received the funds 
(from sales of over-priced farm products) to begin his 
industrialization and militarization proe;rams. As we will 
note in the following chapter it has become apparent in 
recent years that Argentine farmers were not satisfied with 
/ Peron's policy of no reward to the agricultural economy. 
II 
I 
ii 
II 
-!i 
;I 
I 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POST-WAR YEARS: 1946-51 
During the crop year 195-51 grain exports totaled only 
3,424,000 long tons, the lowest since the end of World War II; 
in the crop years 1949-50 they amounted to 4 1 256 1 000 long tons. 
The peak postwar level of exports was 7,018,000 long tons in 
the year 1947-48. Before the war (1934-35 through 1938-39), 
73 
they averaged 10,281,000 long tons annually. 
The annual average wheat production for the period 1935-
39 totaled 6 1 036 thousand metric tons, while for the period 194~ 
,I 
-51 it amounted to only 5,722 thousand metric tons; as for 
maize in the period 1935-391 the annual average totaled 7,671 
thousand metric tons, as against 3 1 870 thousand metric tons, 
74 
in the period 1946-51. 
These introductory figures show the catastrophic decline 
in the production and exports of Argentine farm commodities. 
It will be our purpose in this chapter to further analyze 
the causes underlying tl:iis striking decline which we started 
to consider in Chapter IV. Table VII (page 80) lists the 
production figures for wheat, maize and rye in the postwar 
years 1946-51. 
Trends in annual productio~ and exnorts of grains, 
1946-51. 
' 
II 
il 
II 
I' 
,I 
II 
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TABLE VII 
PROJJ!JCTION OF WHEAT, MAIZE AND RYE, IN THOUSANDS OF 
MEs:'RIC TONS, 
IN THE POSTWAR YEARS, 1946-51 
11:: '!ffiEAT :MAIZE R"l'E 5,615 5,815 552 
:~ 1947 
11948 
: 1949 
,, 1950 
6,664 
5,200 
5,144 
6,000 
5,200 521 
3,450 305 
836 277 
4,000 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publications, 
New York, 1951, pp. 91-93. 
In the crop year 1945-46, the wheat export surplus was 
less than originally expected, due to inclement weather 
ccnditions, "rust" in many regions, and some damage caused 
by locusts in sections of Cordoba and Entre Rios Provinces. 
lr I' The area sown to maize was about the same as that of the year 
1944-45. Although the harvest for 1945-46 {5815 thousand 
metric tons, was larger than the harvest of 1944-451 the volume 
was still far below the annual average crop between 1935 and 
I 1939 ( 7671 thousand metric tons 1 see Table XIII, page 101 ) • 
Drought and locusts caused the drop in harvest figures for 
75 
maize in 1945-46, as they did for oats, barley and rye. 
There was a drop in production and exports of wheat, oats, 
barley and rye, during the crop year 1946-47, but there was 
! an increase in maize exports. Inclement weather conditions 
li played their part in this drop from the previous agricultural 
I' 
11 year, but the maize crop increased due to the fact that a 
I' 
n ,, 
,, 
,, 
j: 
I 
1: 
!i I 
I 
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large sector of acreage was given over to it {for intended 
sale to Great Britain). Thus despite the weather conditions, 
there was an increase in the production and export of maize. 
It was at this time that IAPI began to urge farmers to 
increase their sowings greatly, so that it might reap huge 
profits on the international grain market, where foreign 
purchasers were willing to pay very high prices for agricul-
tural commodities. 
In the crop year 1947-48, grain exports rose considerably 
in quantity over those during 1946-47, despite the fact that 
the area sown was appreciably smaller, especially for wheat 
and barley. Favorable weather aided in the harvest of a larger 
crop than in 1946-47, in spite of reduced plantings~ The area 
sown to wheat, in the crop year 1947-48, was the sw~llest in 
76 
over twenty years. 
comparative trends in grain exports, 1947-51. 
During the crop year 1948-49, farm exports generally 
fell in volume by one-third below their corresponding figures 
in 1947-48; wheat, for example, totaled 1621 thousand tons 
for the export surplus of 1948-49, whereas it totaled 2730 
thousand tons in 1947-48. It was during this crop year that 
foreign purchasers began to object to the hiGh price policy 
pursued by IAPI in export sales of farm products. Their reluc-
tance to pay high prices resulted in delays of Argentine grain 
sales, and constant re-negotiations of prices slowed down 
grain exports in l949, ·:1hen considerable unsold grain surpluses 
II 
il 
lj 
1! 
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TABLE VIII 
YEARLY AVERAGES (IN THOUSANDS OF TONS) OF GRAIN EXPORTS, 
YEAR 
1945-46 
1946-47 
1946-48 
1948-49 
i 1949-50 
1950-51 
''(Annual 
averages 
for the 
period 
1
1946-51, in 
thousands 
WHEAT RYE 
1,811 224 
1,603 103 
2,730 347 
1,621 66 
2,343 261 
2,770 219 
1946-51 
HAIZE OATS BARLEY 
1,151 230 559 
1,920 216 410 
2,917 95 929 
1,830 72 302 
1,225 291 146 
155 245 35 
--"-
I' of tons): 2,146 203 1,533 191 397 
! 
I 
II 
:I 
II 
I 
1,1 
I 
"Note: 
source: 
annual averages for the period 1946-51 have been 
calculated by the author. 
Foreign Agricultural Circular, August 24, 1951, 
Off~ce of Foreign Agricultural Relations, United 
States Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. c., 
page 1. 
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II began to accumulate, and rot. By 1949 also, grain farmers 
I~ 
![ 
II 
:I 
I! 
il 
I 
had purposely cut their acreage on all crops, in order to 
thwart IAPI, which paid them a fixed mini= price little 
above the cost of operation, and prevented them from selling 
their own products in the international 
77 
prices, and on their own terms. 
market at their ovm 
New rates of exchange were established by the Argentine 
Government on october 4, 1949, which hurt the competitive 
position of Argentine grain exports, and were a hindering 
factor to the rise of exports in 1949-50 from their lower 
1948-49 levels. Vlheat, oats and rye rose in 1949-50 over 
their export totals of 1948-49. Also the excellent 1949 
world crops, which were especially good in Europe, curtailed 
the world demand for Argentine farm products; but exports in 
1949-50 were greater than in the previous crop year, because 
Argentina relaxed her sales terms, engaging in 11oarter" deals, 
accepting soft currency for her products, and allowing 11 escape 11 '.'1
1
· 
clauses in sales contracts (whereby purchasers might be 
[I 
I, 
relieved of their responsibility to purchase grains from 
Argentina, should it 
78 
prices elsewhere). 
become possible to purchase at lower 
The agricultural economy in 1950 was influenced by diverse 
factors, but in general there was a favorable trend, in 
that IAPI reduced some grain prices in early 1950, so that 
it could sell some of its grains which were rotting, due to 
insistence on outlandish prices for them. This action on the 
1,', 
" 
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,[ 
In the j: part of IAPI facilitated the resumption of trade. 
I 
latter half of 1950, after the Korean War caused a world-wide 
1 scramble for farm products, and IAPI reverted to its "high-~~ 
I 
1
11 
II 
'I 
price" policies, most foreign buyers cheerfully paid the 
79 
high prices asked, a factor which also facilitated trading. 
In the crop year 1950-51 only wheat exports, of the 
major crops, surpassed the 1949-50 export totals, with 2770 
thousand tons of wheat exported in 1951, against 2343 thousand 
tons in 1950. At first the prospects were good for an excep-
tional 1950-51 harvest, but the final result was only fair, 
because of stem rust, excessive rain, storm damage, and the 
remnants of a severe drought, which affected the 1949-50 
harvest. Farmers responded to the Government's request for 
:'1 
I' 
II ,, 
!! 
il 
increased cultivation which was backed by higher support prices11 
and planted an estimated 14.8 million hectares of wheat, maize, 1 1 
oats, barley, rye and flaxseed, compared with only 12,8 n1illion I 
80 
hectares in 1949-50. 
Peron's Three-Year Plan. 
In late 1949, President Peron announced that the Govern-
'ment, in 19501 would initiate a three-year agricultural plan, ji 
II 
replacing the industrial plan of 1946, and would use all of its 1 
resources to encourage production. Apparently the Peron regime 
was beginning to realize that it had overtaxed the agricultur-
al economy in its ambition to industrialize the country, and 
that since farmers were thwarting IAPI by voluntarily cutting 
down acreage, they would have to relent somewhat and aid 
-----
- -- --- -
---- -----
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agriculture, in order to continue in their industrialization 
and mechanization plans. The Government actually raised 
minimum prices to growers somewhat, imported some amount of· 
'I farm machinery, and liberalized credit terms for farners, 
I Any gains made by farmers through these concessions were 
I 
quickly absorbed by the severe drought of 1949-50, rising 
81 
labor costs, and spiraling inflation. 
Government aids to agriculture. 
In 1950 farmers used credit on an increased scale 
because of high prices and rising costs of production. The 
Government set up special loan programs, stressing low 
interest rates and easy payment terms. The drift of labor 
to the more attractive city employment caused a further 
scarcity of farm labor, and few families on farms took 
advantage of the Government's liberal credit and land aids, 
82 
although it was used more in 1950 than in any previous year. 
sunflower seed ~ ~ example of incentives to boost 
production. rt will be noted in Table IX that sunflower seed 
is the only crop listed therein which has risen in area sown, 
from 1946-50; the reason for this increase is due to the fact 
that IAPI paid a higher price for sunflower seed than for 
similar seeds and most other crops; thus we may assur.1e from 
the drop in area of other grains sown, that some of this 
area was taken up by sunflower seed, on which the farmer 
realizes a larger profit than on the grains the area of 
II 
r, 
I! 
j 
I 
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which was cut down. It seems logical to assume, therefore, 
that if IAPI wishes to have Argentine farmers enlarge the 
area sown for crops, the best incentive for so doing is to 
raise prices paid to farmers for crops, and the:tarmers 
will voluntarily increase acreages. It certainly follows 
that a reduction in the acreage sown or harvested means a 
corresponding reduction in production. Table IX (page 87) 
compares areas sown (for various grains) in yearly averages 
(1946-50) with average areas sown in the periods 1920-40 
and 1940-45. We may thus note the amounts by which the areas 
of each grain have been cut by grain farmers. 
IAPI's errors. 
' The chief mistake made from 1946 onwards was that the 
large profits made by IAPI on the sale of grains in the inter-
national market were not ~ed to further agricultural produc-
tion and development, the backbone of the Argentine econony. 
Thus, agriculture would have been able to compete success-
fully with industry in regard to the wages paid to workers. 
Foreign exchange resources, which were available in large 
quantities in 1946 and 1947, should have been used for wide-
spread mechanization of agriculture, which has not yet been 
done; studies in hybridization have only begun a short time 
ago, and no such seeds are available except in very small 
amounts. 
Argentina losing its customers for farm ~oducts. 
~ ) 
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It is true that the world demand for certain at;ricul- i 
I tural products fell somewhat, at least in some countries, I' 
owing to the excellent crops in 1949, especially in European il 
countries. The Organization of European Economic Cooperation, I! 
composed of European countries receiving aid from the 
Economic Recovery Program concluded that in 1950 they would 
require as many necessary commodities as they did in 1949. 
'."!hat was actually happening was that Argentine farm exports 
were being displaced by exports from other countries. For 
example, in early 1949, exports of vegetable oils and wheat 
to the United Kingdom fell sharply. The British began to 
import more wattle bark from Africa, and less quebracho 
from Argentina. As regards linseed, the insistence by IAPI 
on unreasonably high linseed prices not only led the United 
States to subsidize her own native linseed industry in the 
southern United States (and thus made of Argentina's best 
customer a stiff competitor), but also resulted in an almost 
complete paralyzation of linseed exports, which piled up and 
83 
rotted in Argentine warehouses. 
Mistaken Argentine farm policy contrasted to u. s. 
policy •. 
Argentine farmers suffered greatly during World War II, 
when the shipping shortage made it impossible for them to 
sell their agricultural products overseas, and they were :1 
'I 
lucky to pay their expenses during that time. It would have 11 
__ be~~--~~~~~1l~~~po 1-~~~-f~ol11_1_9_4~ ~~ _ w_~e_n __ " l" _we>_e ,ood, to -~---~ 
:I 
II 
' 
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I 
allow farmers a full share of the high profits made, but 
this was not done. IAPI' s prices to producers were little 
above the cost of operation, and farmers were not cor.1pensated 
1
1 
for their losses in the war years, nor insured against further !I 
confiscation of their profits by IAPI. This short-sighted [i 
policy was the major factor in the decline of agricultural 
production, and robbed the farmer of the compensation he 
needed to help tide him over the bad years. IAPI's policy 
stands in direct contrast to the policy pursued in the 
United States, where farmers were allowed to have complete 
control over the production and marketing of their crops, 
especially in regard to prices charged, terms of sale, and 
customers, with the result that the United States' agricul-
tural market is over-expanding, strong and competitive. 
Critical condition of Argentine economy, 
In 1949 Argentina had already entered a critical stage: 
there were declines in agricultural and industrial output, 
for the reasons mentioned heretofore, continued low produc-
tivity in agriculture (due to lack of mechanization), with 
sharp increases in costs (due to large, continuing wage 
raises and inflation), threats of paralyzation owing to 
lack of raw materials and spare parts (since IAPI's high 
prices for farm products lost many of Argentina's traditional 
customers for these products, with which she purchased these 
raw materials and spare parts), the beginning of a shrink-
age in the domestic market for many products as a result of 
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inflation, and the first signs of unemployment. certainly 
any country in such a condition would view the situation with 
alarm, and attempt to rectify the policies leading her to 
such a state of affairs. It was with this realization in 
mind perhaps, that President Peron announced his Three-Year 
Plan for Government aid to farmers. Rising labor costs, and 
the growing inflation wiped out the benefits of this 
Government aid however, and therefore, for all intents and 
purposes, the "status quo" continued; as exports fell and 
grains rotted in Buenos Aires, the Government• s embarrassment 
over IAPI's losses was apparent through its failure to 
publish any unbiased trade statistics. 
Distortion of Argentine export trade. 
The direction of Argentine trade in n~ny coiT~odities 
was dislocated. During the first three months of 1949, no 
wheat at all was exported to the United Kingdom, yrance, 
Belgium, Holland, sweden and Switzerland, to which countries, 
during the sar.1e period of 1948, 255,000 tons were exported. 
To the same countries in the first three months of 1949, 
273,000 tons of maize v1ere exported, as against 600,000 tons 
for the same period in 1948. These countries also absorbed 
14,000 tons of barley in 1949, as against 161,000 tons in 
1948. Thus Argentine agricultural export trade was not only 
declining heavily, but a distortion was taking place in the 
sense that in many directions, exports to countries with 
hard currencies were being replaced by exports to those vii th 
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soft currencies, or else barter deals were being made which 
were not in all cases bringing in essential goods.34 
Export drive and competitive prices needed to bolster 
economy. The basic problem of the downward trend of 
Argentine agricultural exports stenmed from two causes: 
1. rising production costs, caused by scarcity of farm 
labor,. lack of farm machinery, and inflation of' production 
materials. 
2. IAPI•s high-price policies on the international 
market, which made Argentine exports non-competitive with 
those of her competitors, and lost her former customers to 
these competitors. 
Although President Peron began a mild program of aid to 
the farmer in late 19491 he did not understand the need for 
an aggressive and forceful export drive (such as that under-
taken by Great Britain in 1951, to bolster sales of her 
manufactured goods), to regain the world grain markets which 
Argentina had lost. Until mid-1949 1 Argentina demanded 
excessive prices for nearly all of her major export items, 
especially grains. Although in her 1949 negotiations with 
customers, Argentina stated her readiness to accept world 
market prices, this was not done openly; instead of offering 
farm commodities at a definite price (or even below world 
market prices, to prevent grains from rotting), L~PI 
negotiated singly with each potential customer, setting 
different prices for each. These nations counter-offered with! 
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ridiculously low prices, and this system of dickering 
resulted in prolonged negotiations, and stagnation or the 
Argentine grain export trade. Despite the great advantages 
which state control of foreign trade was deeoed to have in 
protecting Argentine exports, despite the trade agreements, 
exports to the United Kingdom, the United States, ~olland 
and France, exports be~veen 1947 and 19491 fell sharply, as 
85 
the figures in Table X (see Page 96) show. 
Therefore, it is apparent that in all nations which 
devaluated their currencies, new export drives were essential, 
in order to strengthen the nation•s·export trade and gain 
a strong foothold in the international market, In Argentina's 
case such a drive was even more necessary, due to her shortage 
of hard currency, the scarcity of her reserves of foreign 
exchange, and her need to repay old debts in hard currency, 
not to mention her need of hard currency to pay for her 
essential. imports. 
New excha~ rates made competi~ion more difficult. 
The hope for such an export drive was shattered on 
october 4, 1949, when IAPI made a co~plete change in its 
prices, as a result of the new exchange rates, While some 
prices were reduced, many others rose, so that some goods had 
hie;her prices than before the change in exchange rates. Thus, 
instead of using the ner; exchange rates to increase exports 
I 
through competitive prices, IAPI made competition 
86 
cult than before the change in rates. moro dim~-~ --_--
il 
I 
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possible reasons fo~ higher exchange rates. 
Even if President Peron did not have competent economists 
to advise him of the efficacy of an export drive after the 
I. 
change in exchange rates, there were examples of other nations I[ 
who used export drives to good advantage at approximately l1 
this time; if he had wanted to, Peron certainly could have 
followed their example. But no, it is likely that President 
' Peron had other motives in setting some export prices hic;her 
than prior to establishment of the 1949 exchance rates. 
Perhaps there is a hint of r.;r. Per6n•s reasoning in the lines 
of the following strong comments regarding IAPI, from the 
October 11, 1949 1 issue of Economic Survey, a fortnightly 
economic publication of Buenos Aires: 
•••• What then has been the policy behind the estab-
lishment of new exchange rates? To increase the 
book values of IAPI? We say 11book values" and not 
"profits" because with the new rates, more exports 
have been possible, while under the new price policy, 
they will once again be reduced, or else remain on 
a comparatively low level. Whatever the standing of 
IAPI is, we believe it better policy to liquidate 
its stocks, even at heavy losses, and to write these 
losses off. The losses have already been made, and 
it is always sounder policy to strike out the past 
and establish the company afresh on a new basis. 
This applies equally to the economy of a country. 
It is less expensive for the nation if there is a 
real liquidation of IAPI's stocks and the losses 
are written off, for they have already been incurred 
and are expressed in the situation of the country 
(partly in its inflation), than to endeavor once more 
to make book profits, and thus show an improved 
balance sheet which does not represent the true 
state of things.87 
Needless to say, these remarks did not "please" the 
Per6n regime at all, for it did not consider the matter from 
I 
--j--
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the same altruistic viewpoint as did the Economic Survey; 
the purely academic attitude in which the Economic Survey 
viewed the matter did not quite coincide with the viewpoint, 
mostly political, of the Peron Government. Of course, it 
must be readily admitted that many problems, quite sin,ple on 
the surface, become much more difficult if complicated by 
jl 
'I I, 
I! 
I ,, 
I' 
I 
'I 
I! 
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political considerations, and apparently such is the case here~ 
I' 
I 
II 
Government ~ntervention in the ~icultural economy. 
We mie;ht counter our argument here, as regards political 
considerations in governmental intervention in the agricultur-
al economy, by citing the case of the Grain Regulating Board, 
which was set up in 1933 by the Argentine Government and also 
intervened in the agricultural economy, The type and amount 
of "intervention" is the distinguishing feature between the 
two agencies, as a comparison of the two will show, 
Compa~ison of IAPI and the Grain Regulating Board. 
We might compare the Grain Regulating Board to IAPI 
and note the opposite purposes for which both were establish-
ed: 
The Grain Regulating Board was set up only to support 
prices of agricultural commodities, and thus aid the farmer. 
It handled the exports of only those products which were 
normally marketed abroad at below the basic prices it had 
set for payment to producers, and only for the short period 
' 
of time until the foreie;n price rose above those basic prices. 
1 
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It was the instrument through which Argentine agriculture 
climbed from the low depths to which it had fallen in the 
Great Depression. 88 
IAPI, on the other l~nd, was established as an official 
state ac;ency for the purpose o::: controlling all foreign 
trade, both import as well as export. Since most of 
Argentina's exports are agricultural and pastoral, the 
government of President Perbn, which brought IAPI into being 
made huge profits on the foreign sales of farm products from 
1946-481 at a time when the entire world was forced to pay 
almost any price which President Peron asked for these farm 
co~modities. Instead of plowing back these huge profits to 
strengthen agriculture, the backbone of any economy, but 
especially the Argentine economy, President Peron used these 
profits for industrialization and for the benefit and poli-
tical wooing of city populations, at the expense of the 
farmer, who created these profits originally. The essential 
difference between the Grain Regulating_Board and IAPI is 
that the Board respected the free play of market forces, while 
IAPI sought to restrict these forces and bend them to its own 
purposes. 
It is apparent from the Table X ·figures that there 
was a general increase in Argentine exports in 1948 over 
n 1947, but by 1949 exports of farm products to its traditional 
customers had fallen drastically. 
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TABLE X 
r.:ONTHLY AVERAGES OF IEPORTATIONS FROJ,; ARGENTINA, 1947-49 
l;!onthly United Kingdom 
Average (millions of 
pounds) 
1947 
1948 
1949 
10.89 
10.15 
6.02 
United States 
(millio!'ls of 
dollars) 
12.15 
15.30 
7.81 
Eolland 
(millions 
of florins l. 
14.45 
21.93 
15.18 
France 
{billions 
of francs) 
9.85 
13.02 
4.46 
Source: Economic Surve!' Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
october 11, 19 9, page 5. 
Table XI (see Page 97), taken from a study of independent 
exports, made for the 1949 session of the Food and Agricul-
tural Organization of the united Nations, also shows this 
decline clearly, with reference to all grain exports of 
Argentina, to a 11 countries of the world. 
The figures in Table XI (Page 97) not only indicate 
the sharply reduced importance of Argentina in the world 
grain trade, and the leadership of the United States, but 
the absolute decline of the Argentine grain trade, fallinG 
behind even Canada and Australia. The "breadbasket of 
.the world" no lone;er was Argentina, but the United States. 
In 1950, it appeared that the farmer continued to be 
in a prejudiced position due to a further change in exchange 
rates. This became apparent when one noted the exchange value 
of foreign reserves created by the export of Argentina's 
principal agricultural products as compared with the rates 
applicable to the import of farm machinery (see Table XII, 
_Page 9~ • ___ The g:t'e~ter the difference between these two 
!i 
:! 
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TABLE XI 
ANNUAL AVERAGES OF WORLD GRAIN EXPORTS (IJILLIO::S OF TONS) 
1934-35 
BREAD GRAlllS 1938-39 
Argentina 3.5 
United States 1.3 
canada 4.8 
Australia 2.9 
Others 3.9 
TOTAL: 
Argentina's 
percentage of 
total: 
COARSE GRAD<S 
Argentina 
United States 
canada 
Australia 
Others 
TOTAL: 
Argentina's 
percentage 
of total: 
16.4 
7.0 
1.2 
0.5 
0.1 
4.2 
13.0 
53 .8;; 
·:'negligible figure. 
1946-47 
1.7 
10.9 
6.3 
1.3 
0.7 
20.9 
2.6 
4.2 
0.5 
0.6 
7.9 
32.9;; 
1947-48 
3.1 
13.2 
5.9 
2.8 
1.9 
26.9 
11 5''' 
. '' 
4.0 
2.1 
0.1 
0.4 
2.1 
8.7 
1948-49 
1.7 
13.8 
6.1 
1.7 
26.6 
2.2 
4.3 
0.9 
0.5 
1.7 
22,8% 
Source: Economic Survey, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 
13, 1949, pace 3. 
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rates of exchange, the lower the purchasing power represented I~ 
by Argentine farm products. One can notice from Table XI 
that while the September, 1950 rates are better (50% 
difference) than those in effect between October, 1949, and 
August, 19501 (82% difference), nevertheless the farmer 
would appear to be in a worse position than he was under the 
rates operative to September, 1949. The immediate effect of 
the nevr exchange rates, therefore, was to render more costly 
many indispensable articles and items of farming equipment. 
IAPJ; opera tea ~ high. margin of prof:i,_~. 
In November, 1950, the Argentine l.Iinistry of Economy 
stated that IAPI would purchase wheat, oats, barley and rye 
of the 1950-51 crops. Since an earlier directive returned 
grain export operations to private exporters, the only 
apparent reason IAPI would have to acquire these grains for 
export would be to make very large trading profits, about 
40% above the prices it pays to producers. When the grain 
export trade was in private hands (prior to IAPI), the normal 
profit was 3;S. Had the Peron Governnent plov1ed back some of 
this 40% profit into agriculture, there would not have 
occurred the grave shortage in late 1951 of wheat, when the 
Government began to consider the importation of wheat into 
89 
the country formerly termed "breadba sked of the world". 
The River Plate Review, a conservative i3ritish economic 
and business periodical, published in Buenos Aires, printed 
the following corr:tr.~ent in its issue of February 23, 1951, 
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Periods 
To September, 
1949 
october, 1949 
to Aue;ust, 
1950 
From September, 
1950 
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TABLE XII 
VALUE OF THE U.S. DOLLAR FOR 
Import of' Farm 
Export of' Princi- ~.:achinery 
pal Farm Products 
3.35 3.73 
3.35 6.08 
5.00 7.50 
Difference 
Figures in the above table are in Arsentine currency. 
Source: Economic Surve;• Buenos Aires, Argentina, September 
8, 1951; page • 
which referred to the 11 advisabili ty of' announcine; as soon 
as possible the basic prices for next year's harvest." 11 If 
this is not done", the Review said, 11f'armers, who find little 
to encourage them in the results obtained from last year's 
crop, may be led to curtail sowings appreciably, to. their own 
detriment and that of' the national economy". If' the Review, 
careful as it is in remarks in any manner critical of the 
agricultural economy, rnakes such a statement, concern for 
the farmers is not remiss. t:r. ?eron, however, did not 
follow its advice, and did not announce new prices until 
" June, 1951. 
IAP~ raises 1951 minimum prices for crop~. 
President Peron, in announcing the new crop prices in 
I ,I 
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JUne, 1951 1 did not describe the details of the new system, 
whereby the farmer would share in the profits made by IAPI 
from its sales of his grain. The system was first announced 
in I'a~'• 1951, when the 1950-51 maize price vms increased to 
27 pesos; it was stated that over and above this price, the 
farmer would receive a further sum by the end of october, 
which al'lount would depend on the Government's profit after 
deducting all marketing and administrative expenses, as well 
as a sum for "indispensable reserves", It rms also explained 
that the system would apply to all crops handled in the same 
way by IAPI. The President's messac;e further stated: 
the basis prices announced will not, in any circum-
stances, be revised downward. In this way we ensure 
the producer an adequate ninin:um return. If • in 
the colllinercialization of the crops by IAPI, we 
obtain, at today•s international quotations, higher 
profits, the Government wilLclstribute these profits 
amons the producers in the same wav as in the 1950-
51 maize h&rvest. 90 " 
We should note that this statement could be interpreted 
as meaning that the farmers• share in IAPI's profits would 
only pertain to profits earned by IAPI•s selling prices 
which were above the international market prices. If J.:r. 
Peron had this in mind, the far1ners would certainly be dis-
appointed, for the new basic prices set by IAPI in 1950 were 
somewhat below the world price levels, and 1:-r. Peron did not 
have a business reputation of operating on a small profit 
margin. 
Table XIII (see Page lal shows the trend of official 
' prices published by the Peron Government, in the case of the 
~ 
.I 
I 
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four major crops, durinc; the six years of the Government's 
term in office. 
TABU: XIII 
OFFICL~L GEAIH P::1ICES DELIVERED ON WAGON m PORT 
CROP YEAR 
1946-47 
1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
Percent of 
price rise 
from 1947 
to 1951: 
v.1IE.AT 
17 
20 
23 
23.50 
30.50 
34 
76"' 
'' 
(in pesos per metric quintal) 
Ln:saD J'"ATZE ~t.JEF LO'J"lER 
30 13 23 
30 14 28 
30 15.80 29 
34 16 29 
41 27 29.50 
50 30 34 
108;\ 
NOTE: The section of the above table listinc; "percent of 
price rise from 1947 to 1951 11 is the result of the 
author•s work. 
source: River Plate Review, 3uenos Aires, Argentina, June 8, 
m.· page -4~----
Finane~ p~s~yion o~ the farmer. 
If we will check these percentages of price rises in 
the major crops (see Table XIII) granted to the farmers by 
IAPI from 1947 to 1951, against the value of the F. s. dollar 
for import of agricultural machinery in Table XII (see Page 
1 99) 1 wherein we see that the prices of agricultural machine::•y 
I rose over 100 percent (from ;)3.73 in September, 1949, to 
II 
II 
lj 
li 
II 
!I 
,, 
I ii 
I• 
I, I 
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after September, 1950), it appears that the only major 
crop which kept pace with the rise of the ir~:Jorts of farm 
machinery, was maize, IAPII s price for which actually rose 
108% during this period. The other ~ajor crops fell far 
below the 100% rise of farm machinery, wheat being the only 
one which approached this fibllre, with a 76;1, rise. In addi-
tion we must consider that the price of farm machinery had 
also risen in the industrial nations exportinG this machinery, 
which aided in maldng the position of Argentina farmers still 
more difficult. 'I'herefore, if only from the viev;point of the 
farmer's need to purchase agricultural machinery and the 
influence of the spiraling inflation, let alone the other 
farm supplies he required, IAPII s price rises were insuffi-
cient even to maintain the farmer's previous poor financial 
status quo~ 
IAPI forced to increase maize ~ice for 1952 harvest. 
~\he dissatisfaction of w~ize producers over the sreat 
difference between IAPI's purchase price and the price at 
which it sells maize on the international market had forced 
the Government to increase its purchase price from 24 pesos 
per 100 kilos for the 1950-51 crop year, to 30 pesos for 
the 1951-52 harvest, the price which was officially announced 
on June 6, 1951. Farmers. were able to sell ll'~ize at 30 
pesos in the domestic market, and therefore IAPI had to 
meet this price, so that farmers woulc sell their crops to 
91 
IAPI. 
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Decline~ in production and exports of farw, conwodities. 
The downward trend of area sown may be noted by the fact 
that only 10,501,750 acres of wheat were planted in 1951, 
while 14,636,000 acres were planted in 195; in 1951 also, 
the exportable wheat surplus totaled only 18 1 3701 000 bushels 
as opposed to the 1950 wheat surplus of 91,850,000 bushels. 
By comparison, 175,743,000 bushels of wheat were exported in 
1939. 
As regards the downward trend of linseed production and 
exports, 2,713,000 acres were planted in 19501 and these 
fell to only l, 729,700 acres in 1951; correspondingly one 
million metric tons of linseed were exported in 1951, but the 
most that can be expected in 1952 is s.n export surplus of 
300,000·metric tons. The area sown to oats for the crop year 
1951-52 is down by 15){ from the previous crop year, and the 
estimated loss from the diminished export surplus of 'rye, 
92 
barley and oats is about 300,000,000 pesos. 
We may assume therefore, that despite IAPI' s promises 
of sharing profits, and the rises in IAPI's purchase prices 
to the farmer for farm products (which were absorbed by the 
greatly increased costs of labor, production, and imported 
farm machinery), the farmer, at best, rell1..ained in his 
financial status quo, or his situation worsened, as witness 
fl\ the voluntary cutting of areas sown, with the resultant 
greatly diminished export surpluses available to IAPI. 
i 
:1 
II 
I 
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Ha jor factors causing decline in farm export'!_. 
We might conclude that the rna jor factors which led to 
a sharp decline in agricultural exports, compared with those 
of the pre-war period, as follows: IAPI' s high-price sales 
policies (which lost for Argentina many former customers to 
more competitive suppliers), higher costs of agricultural 
production in Argentina as compared to other countries, 
increased domestic consumption of farn products, and 
Government neglect of the agricultural economy, resulting 
in a decrease in production. 
Comparison of pre~ and post-war farm production 
and exports. In Table XV (see Page 10$ we may compare 
the vastly greater agricultural exports of pre-war years, 
in comparison to the diminished ones of post-war years, 
which fell due to inclement weather conditions and severe 
droughts in the crop years 1949-51 and 1951-521 as well 
as for the reasons described in the preceding paragraph. 
It may also be of interest to compare the yearly 
averages (in Table XV) of exports by commodity, in the period 
1935-391 with that of 1946-51, and note that for wheat, maize, 
and oats, the decline was drastic, while rye actually rose in 
production and exports. 
As for production of the chief crops in the periods 
39 and 1946-51, the following table lists these for us; 
1935-l.li 
it : 
,, 
',I 
is apparent from these tables that there vms a downward trend 
I 
in wheat and maize production in the period 1946-51 over the 
--------
- -- ---- ----
I~ 
II 
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period 1935-39. 
YEAR 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
TABLE XIV 
PRODUCTION OF 'J\1HEAT, MAIZE Jl.liD R"-'E, IN THOUSANDS 
OF' !.IETRIC TONS, IN THE PRE-'t!AR AND POST-WAR 
YEARS (1935-39, 1946-51) 
WHEAT 
-
3,850 
6,802 
5,650 
10,319 
3,558 
5,615 
6,664 
5,200 
5,144 
6,000 
J.:lHZE 
10,051 
8,640 
4,424 
4,864 
10,375 
5,815 
5,200 
3,450 
836 
4,000 
RYE 
153 
216 
131 
371 
370 
552 
521 
305 
277 
source: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publications, 
New York, l95l, pp. 91-93. 
COMPARISON 
TABLE XV 
OF PRE-WAR AND POST-j'lAR EXPORTS OF 
AGRICULTUR.U COJiiil'ODITIES 
(in thousands of tons) 
I 
j! 
II 
II 
' :mAR WHEAT l1IAIZE OATS BARLEY 
Ill 1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
3,860,043 
1,610,386 
3,887,195 
1,940,356 
4,745,944 
Yearly 
Average 
in Thous-
ands of 
Tons, 
1935-39: 
3,208.7 
--
7,051,460 ---# 
8,381,390 176,760 
9,087,363 403,397 
2,642,150 381,795 
3,196,073 359l79l 
6,071.7 330.2 
_" ____
l, 035,794 
246,994 
254,496 
211,650 
259,513 
243.2 
~:-
---# 
134,579 
92,332 11, 52,312 
194,85:1: I 
I 
118.5 
I 
. ····~ . 
I! 
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TABLE XV (continued) 
l'"EAR WHF.AT J.TAIZE OATS DAELEY RYE 
------
1945-46 1,811 1,151 230 559 224 
1946-47 1,603 1,920 216 410 103 
1947-48 2,730 2,917 95 929 347 
1948-49 1,621 1,830 72 302 66 
1949-50 2,343 1,225 291 146 261 
1950-51 2,770 155 245 35 219 
Yearly 
average 
in Thous-
ands of 
Tons 2,146.3 1,533 191.5 397 203.3 
" 
":Jenotes total exports in 1935 for oats, barley and rye, 
which are not included in the yearly average, 1935-39. 
#Figure not available. 
Source: Anuario del Comercio Exterior, 1944 1 2uenos Aires, Argentina;-page 136. 
source: Foreign Agricultural Circular, A:ll,gust 24 1 1951, 
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 
United States Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, D. C., page 1. 
Note: Yearly averages (1935-39 and 1946-51) in above 
tables are result of author's work. 
Correct post-war role for IAPI. 
During the post-war years, the only really positive 
role which IAPI should have played in regard to grain 
marketing was that of a regulating factor, in order to 
protect the farmer from variations in the international mar-
ket, but without profiteering at the farmer's expense. This 
role would have been comparable to that played by the pre-war 
Grain Regulating Board, which aided the agricultural economy 
~~~.C-~. ~j;o ~#J3~~:f'r()m~i;he ~d~.Vj;lJ.s.-t£~~gi_Q11,_!~ l'll\dfallen as a result 
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I l 
11 
1: of the Great Depression, through price supports, etc. 
i! 
:1 It is apparent that during the post-war years, 1946-51, 
,, 
\, there was a general downward trend in agricultural produc-
tion and exports, caused by a variety of factors, the out-
standing one being the very low prices paid to farmers by 
I, the Government, which allowed the farmers an extremely sw~ll 
II 
II 
I' 
II 
'.I 
II 
I' 
I 
'I 
II 
!I 
II 
!! 
' 
profit above the costs of production. As a result of this 
Government policy, not only was there no incentive to increase 
the acreage under cultivation, as requested by the Government, 
but the opposite effect was realized, and farmers began a 
systematic reduction of areas under cultivation; in an obvious 
retailiation to the Government's policy of small reward to 
the farmer. The inevitable result of such a situation was a 
decline in agricultural production and exports. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l,j 
l· 
' 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
President Peron time and a8ain stated that it was his aim 
to build Argentina into a mighty, self-sufficient, industrial 
'!nation; it is true the-t under Peron the once all-powerful 
cattle barons received their death blow, for Peron knew that 
to maintain himself in power, he must cater to the present-day 
.: wielders of political sovereignty, labor and industry. 
Peron realized he was badly in need of money to build up 
the mighty nation which he dreamed would result from his Five-
Year Plan (1946-51} of transforming Argentina from a basically 
agricultural-export economy to one of an industrial nation, 
·'still greatly endowed with the agricultural resources on which 
she had traditionally lived. In 1946 and 1947, the chance 
came to reap vast fortunes by buying agricultural commodities 
from Argentine farmers at little above the cost of production 
... and selling them on the world market, hungry for these ,oods, 
., 
''at prices five times the prices paid for these commodities. 
',Thus did Peron use Argentine agriculture ~o build his indus-
trial machine, for nmch of the profits reaped from the sales of 
,'1 Argentine wheat and other grains were used to build machinery. 
Foreign exchange ahortage hinders Peron's plans. 
But to the dismay of Per6n, the 11 gravy-train11 of hie;h 
,'grain prices 11broke" in 1948, and since that time he has 
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'experienced constant difficulties in continuing his ambitious 
'I iiindustrial dream. Not only did the balloon of fantastic wheat 
l!profi ts explode in 1948 when wheat from other sources (such as 
1-
, 
lithe United States, 
.1 (thus forcing down 
!I 
etc.), become available on the world market 
Per6n•s prices), but because of the fact 
''that Are;en tine importers were allowed to import any item they 
i 
1 wished during, the United states' "export heyday" of 1946-47 
(Argentina imposed exchange controls in 1947, as well as quotas 
'on non-essential items), Per6n lacked the foreign exchange to 
!import sufficient of the capital goods vi tal to the continuation 
I 
,;or the industrial dream he had cherished for Argentina. It is 
i'also true that IAPI had squandered millions of dollars on 
ii 
:jUnited States Army surplus equipment which is useless, and now 
;i 
Hies rotting on Buenos Aires docks; were these dollar credits 
li 
11used more wisely, he might have come closer to realizing his 
! 93 
!dream. 
' 
Per6n, therefore, was forced to scale down the dimensions 
,, 
11 of the plans of his dream for Argentina in 1949, and in the 
, same year he diminished the powers of IAPI whereby certain 
1 
areas of Argentine foreign trade were returned to private enter-
i[prise. Likewise, he was forced to scale do~m Argentine grain 
'!prices on the world market which was done reluctantly and only 
,, 
.!after much of the c;rain rotted in :Buenos Aires because no one ,, 
,, 
'lwould now pay the outlandish prices he persisted in asking. 94 
I, ,, 
i: 
;I 
Per6n-maintains .~ontrol, despite dissatisfaction of 
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farmers. More and more, Per6n bogged down in the mire of 
difficulties, and now and then came cries of discontent from 
various elements of the population: now the labor group would 
complain of inflation and rising prices; this was alleviated 
" i! 
!: by mandatory raises from employers, who, when they complained, 
were given tax concessions, import privileees, etc. The old 
cattle aristocracy was an avowed enemy and did not require 
catering. 
The one element on which Per6n depended became more and 
more coenizant of the advantage being taken of it, and 
retaliated in kind. Peron found a Good thing when he bought 
grain at little above the cost of production, and sold it on 
the world market for five times his cost; unfortunately, he 
' did not return the favor to the farmers, and they began cut-
ting down production, so that by 1950, even if Peron could 
have gotten his former "top price" for agricultural commodi-
ties, the supplies he could offer would be considered scanty 
compared to those he had in former years. Rumblings were 
heard in Argentina from various quarters, and it was felt 
that perhaps the economic difficulties brought on by Peron's 
schemes and high-handed activities would result in a political 
·' upheaval. But wily Per6n continued to reward his 11 descami-
sados", placate industry through subsidies, etc., and continue 
his juggling act. 
Reasons for United States' loan to Argentina. 
. -::>:-: -_ = -- --- -- ------
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who managed to receive a loan of $125 millions from the United 
States. He was able to convey the idea that he might easily 
become warm to the Soviet Union, so our policy makers were 
convinced that it would be worthwhile to "keep Peron in line", 
in view of the apparent world-wide Soviet threat. An equally 
important economic consideration was the fact that United 
states firms had no chance of being paid for their goods, 
tied up in Argentina because of the 11 dollar shartage 11 ; so 
to "bail ou t 11 these firms, as well as to bolster up United 
~tates export trade (and keep up one section of our economy 
which economists said was heading for a recession in the 
summer of 1950, and which might be averted by this action), 
the United states gave this loan to Peron. 
Peron was aware that he always reaped profits during a 
' war, so at the outbreak of the Korean War, he again fe 1 t that 
he could sell his agricultural commodities on the world market 
for high prices. He felt this was timed right, in order to 
save his position, and was sure that Korea would soon burst 
forth into a full-scale World War III between the East and the 
West, in which he would play both sides against each other 
for his own advantage while selling his agricultural commodi-
i' ties at the highest possible prices. 
Unf'ortuna tely for Peron, this dream did not come true, 
,.., and at this writing, he is now in a 1vorse position than in the 
spring of 1950, economically speaking. Politically, he is 
always careful to play up to the whims of his 11 descamisados 11 , 
n 
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who are his mainstay. 
Causes of Argentina's economic troubles. 
The following article, taken from Newsweek magazine, 
November 26, 1951 (Page 49), describes Peron's strong and 
weak points politically and gives a very well appraised view 
of his serious economic difficulties: 
For much if his country's economic trouble, Per6n is 
responsible. Argentina by nature is primarily a 
producer of meat, wheat and agricultural raw materials. 
This didn't fit Peron's grandiose ideas of a new and 
greate:r Argentina, which could make its own machines 
as well as grow its own food. so he embarked on a 
program of industrialization at the expense of agricul-
ture. The government paid farmers and stockmen low 
prices for their products and sold them abroad for 
high prices, using the profits to build up industry. 
The farmers balked and cut down their production. It 
was further reduced by a steady drain of farm workers 
to the cities. The population of Buenos Aires went 
up a million in a little more than a year. 
What Peron started, nature finished. For the past 
two years, Arcentina has suffered from devastating 
droughts. The parched pampas, once rich ln corn, 
wheat and cattle, have been cracking and blowing 
away in clouds of dust. A writer in the ec.onomic 
journal, The Review of the River Plate said, "Last 
week I visited one of tne-western ranches in the 
south of Santa Fe province, and while there I saw 
part of the province of Cordoba blowing over in the 
form of a huge yellow cloud. 11 
As a result of these man-made and nature-made 
disaster, there have been actual scarcities of 
beef in Buenos Aires, the legendary beef capital 
of the world. A couple of weeks ago butter was 
completely unobtainable. Portenos fortunate enough 
to have the right connections were bringing it in a 
pound at a time across the River ~late from Uruguay. 
More serious, there was no meat or wheat for export, 
and Argentina was losing enormous amounts of the 
foreign exchange it had earmarked for industrializa-
tion. Meanwhile, the industrial plant already built 
was slov,ly breaking down from lack of replacements. 
The circle was truly a vicious one. Peron was 
destroying agriculture to build industry, but he 
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could only get the money to build industry by bolster-
in8 up agriculture. One authority predicted a reversal 
of government policy to favor agriculture and so 
encourage exports. Others feared that political exuber-
ance over the election results might blind the govern-
ment to economic realities. They viewed with alarm 
the elevation of relatively untried persons to posi-
tions of influence in the making of economic policy. 
Only recently, Argentina began to i'eel a shortage of' 
' wheat, while in the spring of 1951 the export of beef and 
hides was allocated. No one in his wildest dreams would have 
ever believed that a shortage of wheat and meat could have 
occurred in the "bread basket" of the world; but it has 
happened, as a result of Peron's econorr~c policies. 
Dire results of Peron's policies ~ agricultural economy. 
11 II ji 
The resistance newspaper, Argentine Libre (Free Argentina), 
';\ published somewhere in Argentina by the opposition leader, 
; Silvano Santander, in an editorial of May 17, 1949, tells of 
the damage, economic, financial and political, which IAPI's 
operations have brought to the Argentine economy: 
What gigantic, fabulous sums of money the operations of 
IAPI have cost the country, and how Argentina has lost 
important consumer markets, has lost prestige among the 
family of nations, has unhinged its own agricultural 
production, placing it at the brink of a crisis which 
it will be very difficult to avoid. IAPI was created 
to conf'isca te the normal and legitimate prot! ts of' our 
farmers, and to gather in~the harvests for the hungry, 
impoverished European peoples in the post-war period, 
and with the copious profits from these synchronized 
depredations, to build a mighty, mechanized army, Lord 
only knows for what purpose except to subjugate the 
Argentine nation. 
IAPI succeeded perfectly in the first of these aims; 
however, the Marshall Plan frustrated its efforts to 
aid Europe with its food. As for the mighty army, it 
is so highly trained and mechanized that it has all 
-- --F-----~~-----
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its needs filled, except foodstuffs. In view of such 
results, and without taking into account the corruption 
of the IAPI scandals, which are characteristic of any 
militaristic regime and not alone of the Institute, 
can we but deplore the Peron Government's actions? 
IAPI, an institution essentially and basically an 
instrument of a militarist demagogue regime, has over-
whelmed us with the useless military machine at the 
expense of our agricultural economy, and to the less-
ening of our prestige and credit abroad. Its dissolu-
tion will be the official acknowledgement of its 
collapse. Democratic opposition, prepare to reclaim 
power, and save our country from this catastrophe! 
We can thus take note of the opposition to the Peron 
Government within Argentina which IAPA and its control of the 
agricultural economy have fostered among farmers and opposition' 
groups. 
In November 1951, President Peron told a group of visit-
ing United States congressmen that during his second term in 
i office, "he hoped to double Argentina's agricultural produc-
tion. 11 He said he would do this "by irricating 2,500,000 
acres of arid land, and by stimulating production on the 
present 11,creage by mechanization and by other means" .95 
No export surpluses expected for major crops, 1951-52. 
Argentina, however, formerly termed "bread basket and 
meat market of the world", was now suffering a meat and grain 
,, shortage. The 1951-52 harvest in Are;entina was the poorest in 
forty years with the wheat harvest estimated at three million 
metric tons, a little more than half the previous crop, and 
much less than half the 1936-40 average of 6,900,000 tons a 
I 
11 
year. As the home market consumes approximately 3,200,000 tons 
,, 
li 
=c=" =if=~-~~'~'=''~'--~''=~- '' -~- .c~~-=--====--~-=--= ~-c-~ --~ c ____ , c ~--=- ~-' ~~,____-=~~==~ 
( 
-115-
-·-.~it- -- ·- -------- ~-.--- --- -_-··c-.o·--------
,, 
•;, a year, the prospect is that there wi 11 be no export surplus 
in wheat in 1951-52, with rye, barley and oats in a relatively 
similar situation. The heavy November rains increased the 
possibilities for fair maize crops, in accordance with post-
war maize plantins; the 1951-52 maize area is estimated to be 
6,500,000 acres in comparison with pre-war sewings to maize of 
fifteen million acres. 96 
The area sown to flax (source of linseed products), was 
1,850,000 acres as compared with the pre-war average of 
7,410,000 acres. The 1951-52 flax crop is estimated at 
i' 400,000 tons, while the pre-war flax crops averaged 1,600,000 
tons. 
Government policies make farming less attractive. 
Although there were two very bad droughts between 1949 
and 1952 and a locust plague in 1951, the agricultural policies 
of the Peron Government have been the basic causes for the 
sorry plight of the Argentine agricultural economy. These 
policies favoring industry and industrial city workers to the 
., detriment of agriculture and farm labor, attracted agricultural 
;I 
:! workers to city employment in factories (where ~vages were 
higher, thus causing a farm labor shortage); also the profits 
resulting from IAPI's sales of agricultural products on the 
international market were invested in industry, to fUrther 
11 
the realization of Peron's plans, and not returned to agricul-
,! 
!, ture, the originator .of these profits, as 
lj 
they should have been 
ii in the form of farm machinery, and modern agricultural 
=·,c·~~ ==~c.ccc .-.••••-~=•=-~~-~-··-=~- ·~~==·••-~~ 
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techniques. As a result, farming has become less attractive 
during each pas sin[; year of the Peron regime '.s control of the 
agricultural economy.97 
In order to remedy this drastic situation, the Peron 
Government belatedly offered to share its profits as an 
incentive to farmers, in order that the production of grains 
might rise. Even if this inducement should succeed, there 
will be an intermediate period during which no export sur-
pluses will be available, as a result of the Government's 
previous policy of no reward to the farmer.98 
The author has thus sought to show that the trend in 
agricultural production and exports in Argentina from 1946-51 
has been downward; he has tried to show this trend not only 
through figures tal{en from statistics of the Office of Foreign 
Agricultural Relations of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, and of the United States Department of Commerce, 
but has demonstrated that the figures released by IAPI and 
by President Peron's central Bank showed this downward trend, 
for the values listed therein merely expressed the upward 
1 trends caused by creepine; inflation and the higher exchange 
rates (whereby imports into Argentina also are over-valued); 
but also through Argentine publications such as the River 
\ 
Plate Review and Economic Survey, both of which claim that 
agriculture, being the highly imponderable sector of the 
economy that it is, it would be in a healthier position in 
,; almost every respect, were IAPI to return the agricultural 
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exports of Argentina to private hands. 
Possible solution:. incentives to the farmer. 
It may be stated that in order to gain fUrther cooperation 
from farmers to produce farm products for the year 1951-52, 
IAPI offered to share its profits with farmers on these items. 
This action of the Government is in itself an open admission 
that IAPI's previous policies and activities tended to cause 
the downward trend in ae;ricultural production and exports; to 
counteract this downward trend at a time when large profits 
could again be made on the foreicn market due to the scarcities 
caused by the Korean War, IAPI could only offer to share its 
profits with producers, and thus provide the incentive to 
! raise production, actually the key to much of this problem. 
In order to raise the production of its leadinc crops, 
, the Argentine Government should revamp its agricultural 
ii 
11 policy, and institute the following measures: the elinination 
,, 
'I 
!• of IAPI's control of the agricultural economy, in all phases 
!! 
li (with the consequent return of the export of agricultural 
II 
·:commodities to private enterprise); Government aid to agricul-
i', ! ture, including the sale of farm machinery to agricultural 
:! 
1
,, producers on liberal credit terms, technical assistance to the 
. li farmer (soil conservation, crop rotation, hybridization, etc.), 
,, 
I, so as to raise production with minimum labor; finally, a system 
I 
I 
)1, of Government subsidies, long-term financing, or both, in order 
II ;,to instill in the farmer the needed confidence, so .that he will ,, 
,, 
il 
I' ~~=+==~=··c~.c.~o~cc;c~=~--
'li: 
II 
1: 
,I 
' 
. ', 
;; 
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really begin to voluntarily raise production, instead of 
cutting it. 
Under such a system of Government aid and interest in the 
agricultural economy, in which the farmer will receive the 
profits from the labor and financial risks he undertakes, and 
in which he will be free to sell his products to whomever he 
wishes, lies the best possible incentive for the rsal recovery 
in agricultural production and exports • 
==-~ =·~1.,_,,,=, ,,,. 
-119-
I1~EX OF FOOTNOTES 
l oscar K. Moore, Argentine Fermin~ and Farm Trade, 
1 Foreign Agricultural Report NUmber 25, Of ioe-ol""F''reign 
Agricultural Relations, United states Dept, of Agriculture, 
Washington, D. c., JUne, 1948, p. 3. 
2 Loc. £!!•• p. 3. 
3 A. curtis Welgus, The Devell*ment of His~anic America, 
(New York, N. Y., Farrar & Rinehart olishers, 1 41), p. 366. 
4 Oscar K. Moore, Op. Cit., p. 10. 
5 Ibid,, P• 16. 
6 During the early years of the twentieth century, 
,, :many immigrants came to Argentina in order to earn money 
during the crop season, and then return home ("swallow" 
i' inuiligrants). This explains why those leaving Argentina 
,, after coming there from Europe numbered such a great quantity. 
7 oscar K. Moore, Q2• Cit., p. 17. 
8 Loc. Cit., p. 17. 
9 Preston E· James, Latin America (New York, N.Y.: 
L The Odyssey Press, 1950), p. 321. 
10 oscar K. Moore, op. Cit., p. 19. 
ll oscar K. Moore, Op. 
.£!!·· P• 22. 
12 Oscar K. Moore, op. Cit., P• 19. 
13 Economic Review, series II, Volume l, Number l, 
Bureau of Economic Research, Banco de la Ar~entina, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, 1937, 281. P• 
14 vernon Lovell Phelps, The International Economic 
'I Position of Argentina, Universicyof Pennsylvania Press, 
!, Phi1ade lp'fifa, Penna., 1937, P• 3. 
15 Ibid •. , p. 5. 
16 oscar K. Moore, Op. Cit., p. 19. 
-120-
17 Pavel p. Egoroff, Argentina's Agricultural Exports 
During World War II, (War-Peace Pamphlet Number 8 1 Food 
Research InstitUte; Stanford University, California, 
November, 1945), P• 1. 
18 Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of 
Argentina, (Washington, D. c.-;-united states Tariff 
collliilission, 1950) I TC 1.22; Ar 3, p. 64. 
19 A~ricultural, 
AgfentinaWashington, 
I 7), p. 26. 
20 Ibid. I p. 30. 
Pastoral and Forest Industries in 
D~ c., United States Tariff Conmiission, 
21 Loc. Cit., p. 30. 
22 Economic Review, Series II, Volume 1, Number 1, 
Bureau of Economic Research, Banco central de la Republica 
Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina, l930, ·p:-306. 
23 vernon Lovell Phelps, QE• Cit., p. 17. 
24 Agricultural, Pastoral and Forest Industries in 
Arfentina, (Washington, D. C., Unfted States Tariff Commission, 
.• 19 7), P• 34. 
25 et passim. 
26 et passim. 
27 et passim. 
28 et passim. 
29 et passim. 
30 Virgil salera, Exchange control an~ the Argentine 
Uarket, (New York, No Y., Columbia University Press, 1941), 
p. 10'7. 
31 Loc. Cit., p. 107 
32 In writing Chapter III, I have closely followed the 
'War-Peace Pamphlet Number 8 (November, 1945), published by 
:. the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California, 
,ititled Argentina's Agricultural Exports During World War l1.L 
by Pave'! p. Egoroff, which is an excellent study of the 
production and exports of agricultrual commodities, and tke 
problems relating to the use and marketing of these commidities 
,,faced by Argentina during World war II. 
!I 
~~~·~·-=·,=·=·~~~~-=·~·-~ ---~--~~-- ---· 
~ 
·r 
I 
-121-
33 Ibid., p. 3. 
34 Ibid., p. ll. 
35 Ibid. 1 p. 14. 
36 Ibi~. 1 pp 18 et sqq. 
37 Pavel P. Egoroff, Op. Cit., pp. 20 et sqq. 
38 Pavel p. Egoroff 1 Op. Cit., pp. 24 et sqq. 
39 The Economic Situation in Argentina (Washington, 
D. C., International Reference Service, United states 
Dept. of Commerce, 1944) 1 p. 2. 
40 Virgil Salera, Op. Cit., p. 102. 
41 Ibid. 1 p. 106. 
42 Recent Developments in the Foreign Trade of 
Argentina, UniTed States TariffComnission, -washington, 
D. c., 1950, TC 1.22: Ar 3 1 p. 55. 
43 oscar K. I.!oore, op. Cit., p. 22. 
44 Foreie;n Connnerce Weekly, (Washington, D. c., 
United States Dept. of Commerce, ·september 7 1 1946) 1 p. 24. 
45 The creation of the "strong" IAPI, which converted 
the export-import business into a government monopoly is in 
fact, associated with Per6nts rise to power in the "elections" 
of February, 1946. 
46 Previously, the Central Bank exercised powers over 
native-owned banks, such as our Federal Reserve System 
maintains, as well as over Argentine branches of foreign 
banks. Under a law passed in 1935, no new Argentine branches 
of foreign banks were henceforth to be permitted; in 
addition, the Central Bank would supervise activities of 
banks in Argentina, foreign-owned as well as Argentine-
owned, as regards their circulation, credit, discount and 
rediscount, deposits, etc. 
47 Dr. w. P. Schuch, "Argentine New Deal Means State 
control" 1 Barron's Business and Financial Weekly, June 17, 
1946, p. z;; 
48 Ibid., p. 4. 
49 "Argentina's New Order" 1 Business Week, August --~~! 19~~~~~:p_:p~}~3-~J_4o ~~~c ---~- ··-·- ___ -_-
!! 
II 
I 
I 
-122-
50 Loc. 21!•• p. 114. 
51 Loc. Cit., P• 114. 
52 11 Honopoly in Argentina; state J.Ionopoly of Export 
and Import Trade 11 , Economist (London, England) 1 155 : 1023, 
December 18 1 1948. 
53 Loc. 21!•• p. 1023. 
54 Ibid., P• 1024. 
55 11 Per6nls Policy in Danger", Economist, (London, 
England), 155: 498, September 25, 1948. 
56 United Press Dispatch, National Foreign Trade 
Council Report, Reference Number M-671, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, J.:ay 3, 1948, p. 1. 
57 Ibid., P• 2. 
58 Ibid., P• 4. 
59 Ibid., P• 5. 
60 Authoritative sources corroborate the real story 
behind these extremely high-cost purchases made by IAPI: 
Argentine Government purchasing agents requested United 
states suppliers to charge the Argentine Government much 
higher prices than those which the suppliers had orisinally 
asked. The difference betvieen these two prices was the 
11 kick-back11 which the heads of the Argentine Government 
received as a result of these illegal operations of IAPIIs 
purchasing agents. An excellent source for corroborating 
and reporting these illegal operations of the Per6n Govern-
ment is the underground outlawed newspaper, "Argentina Libre 11 • 
61 11Argentina 1 s Growing Economic Ills 11 , United 
states_ New:o;_ and World Report, ~;:arch 5 1 1948 1 p. 32. 
62 "Peron 1 s Policy in Danger 11 , ;;;conomist, (London, 
England), 155:4981 September 25 1 1948. 
/ 
63 "Losing Gamble for Peron 11 , United States News 
and World Report, october 151 19481 pp. 25-28. --
64 "Institute Argentino de Promocion del Intercambio 11 1 Time Hagazine, 52: 401 September 20, 1948. 
65 Loc. Ci~., P• 40. 
66 11 Tossed out 11 , Tir.'e Hagazine, 53: 31, January 31, 
1949. 
-123-
67 Newsweek, February 28, 1949, p. 40. 
68 Business. Vieek, I.!arch 26, 1949, pp. 124-26. 
69 "Argentine Crisis: A Bust Due?", United States liews 
and ~orl~ Report, 26: 26, February 18, 1949.------
70 LOCo Cit., P• 26, 
71 Ibid., P• 27. 
72 Report from ~ ~ Times, January 29, 1948. 
73 Argentine 1950-51 Grain Exports Heach Postwar Low, 
(Washington, D. c., Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 
United States Dept. of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural 
Circular, August 24, 1951), p. 1. 
74 statistical Yearbook, united Natio~s Publications, 
19511 PP• 91-93. 
75 Comercial Pan Americana, Op. Cit., p. 9. 
76 Op. Cit., p. 1. I 
77 Economic Survey, BUenos Aires, Argentina, November, I' 
22, 1949, p. 4. 
78 Ibid. I october 11, 1949, p. 7. 
79 "Foreign Service Report Series", Argentine 1950 
Economic Review, (Washington, D. c., United--states-De~ 
~Commerce, Number 8, May, 1951), p. 1. 
80 Loc. Cit., p. 1. 
81 Op. Cit., P• 2. 
82 Loc. Cit., p. 2. 
83 Economi~- Survey, Op. Ci~., Iiay 3, 1949, p. 2. 
84 Ibid., p. 3. 
85 Ibid., P• 4. 
86 Economic Survey, op. Cit., October 11, 19491 p. 6. 
II 
II 
I' II 
i] 
I' 
i 
I 
-124-
87 Rodolfo Katz is an Argentine economist and publi-
sher of a semi-monthly newsletter which he circulates among 
business and government officials throtcghout the world. 
Since the inception of IAPI, Mr. Katz has criticized its 
policies, its overwhelming powers, and its actions which 
are incongruous with the best interests of the Argentine 
economy as he sees it. He has been especially bitter in his 
denunciation of IAPI•s treatment of Argentine agriculture, 
and for his questioning of the vlisdom of the Argentine 
Government's establishment of new exchange rates in the 
October 11, 1949 issue of Economic Survey, he was severely 
be a ten by President Peron r s secret police. 
Nevertheless he continued to express his innermost 
feelings regarding the Argentine economy, with special 
emphasis on IAPI and the ill-treatment of the farmer. 
Finally, on !.!arch 20, 1951, he \vrote a scathing c1•iticism I' 
of IAPI in economic and legal terms, and called for its demise 
as detrimental to the best interests of Argentina. On April 11 
3, 1951, instead of the usual fortnightly issue of his I 
periodical, r::r. Katz mailed out the followine announcement: 'I 
"Technical difficulties have prevented the publication !I 
of today' s issue. Once these difficulties have been overcorae, 1,1 
the subscriptions in force will be extended for a period I 
equivalent to that of the suspension in the delivery of our 'j' 
weekly.'' i 
Two months afte1• his "blasphemy" of April 3, 1951, (as I' 
official policy might rec;ard his views), l.ir. Katz was allowed 1 1 
to revive his newsletter, provided he refrain from ~ri ticizing II 
IAPI, or make critical remarks regardinG the asricultural ·I 
economy; also he was allowed to circulate his periodical · 
within Argentina only. These are the extremes to which a i 
government too proud (or fearful) to adr.Jit its policy errors 1 
will go, in order to save face, and perpetuate its control. ;; 
88 Virgil Salera, Exchan.D"e Control and the Argentine 
J.Tarket, (New York, N.Y., ColumBia un~versity Press, 1941), 
p. 10?. 
89 Econom~c. Survey, Qp. Cit., September 8, 1950, p. 8. 
90 Review of the River Plate, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
JUne 8 1 1951, p. 16.---
91 Agricultural, Pastoral and Forest Industries in 
Argentina, Op. Cit~-;-p. "'Y1. --·-·--
92 Ibid., p. 38. 
93 Recent Develonments in the Foreign Trade of 
Argentina, Op. Ci~., p.-67. 
,[ 
'j 
II 
I· 
II 
! 
-125-
94 Ibid. 1 p. 68. 
95 lle~ Yor~ Times, January 4, 1952, p. 65. 
96 Loc. Cit. 
---
97 Loc. Cit. 
98 Loc. Cit. 
II I 
,, 
,, 
I' ,, 
'I 
jl 
I 
I 
I ,I 
I 
,, 
il I. 
I' I =~·=·---··f.= 
II 
!i 
II 
., 
ll 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
::: 
i 
-126-
A. BOOKS 
James, Preston E., Latin America. Revised edition; 
New York: The odyssey Press, 1950. 
Salera, Virgil, Exchange Control and the Argentine 
Market. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 
i! Wilgus, A. Curtis, The Development of Hispanic America. 
:1 New York, Farrar& Rinehart Publishers, l94l, 366. 
li 
i! 
i 
I 
I! 
.I 
B. PERIODICAL ARTICLES 
"Argentine Crisis: A Bust Due?" United States News 
and World Report, 26:26, February 18, 1949.----
"Argentina Is Growing Economic Ills" 1 United Sta tea News 
and WorlCJ: Report, March 5, 1948, 32. 
"Argentina 1 s New Order", Business wee~, August 24, 1946, 
113-14. 
Business Week, March 26, 19491 124-26. 
Economic surve!, Buenos Aires, Argentina, following issues: 
May 3, 19 91 2-4. 
October 11, 1949, 6-7. 
November 22, 1949, 4. 
september 8, 1950, 8. 
"Institute Argentino de Promocion del Intercambio", 
Time Magazine, 52:40, September 20, 1948. 
"Losing Gamble for Peron", United states News and World 
Report, October 15, 1948, 25-29. ---- ---
"Monopoly in Argentina; State Monopoly 
Import Trade", Economist, London, 
December 18, 1948. 
of Export and 
England, 155:1023, 
il Newsweek, February 28, 1949, 40. 
I 
1! "Peron's Policy in Danger", Economist, 
i 155:498, September 25, 1948. 
London, England, 
. ·- - -----~ ____ ., ______ _ 
.,_ ·- --- . 
+- ·-_--:: :.:.-:-_-o -::::.:-:-·.~ -:1~--:=--·=-=== 
i 
I 
-127-
Review of the River Plate, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 8, -1951, 16. 
Schuch, Dr. w. P., "Argentine New Deal !.Ieans State Control", 
Barron's Busines13_ and Finan~ial Week~, June 17, l946,3-4j 
"Tossed Out", Time ITagazine, 53:31, January 31, 1949. ! 
I, 
Newsweek, November 26, 1951 1 49. 
c. ESSAYS 
Phelps, Vernon Lovell, The International Economic Position 
of Argentina. Phi1n0elphia, Pennsylvania:--University 
Of Pennsylvania Press, 1937. Pp. 3 1 5 1 17. 
D. PARTS OF SERIES 
'I 
II 
I 
Comercial Pan Americana. Washington, D. C., Pan American 
union;-volume XV, -NUmbers 7 and 8, 1946. Pp. 1, 9 et sqq · 
Economic Review, Series II, Volume I, NUmber 1, Bureau of 
Economic.Research, Banco central de la Republica 
Argentin~, Buenos Alres, Argentina; 1930. P. 306. 
Economic Review, Series II, Volume 1, Nmnber 1, Bureau of 
Economic Research, Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina, Buenos Alres; Argentina; 1957, p. 281. 
Egoroff, Pavel P., Ar entina•s Agricultural Exports During 
World War II wVar-Peace Pamphlet Number 8) 1 I<'ood 
Research Institute, Stanford University, california, 
Noven:ber, 1945. Pp. 1, 3, 11, 14 1 18, 20, 24 1 et sqq. 
Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publications, New York, 
1951, pp. 91-93. 
United Press Dispatch, National Foreifn Trade Council Report, 
Reference Number 1!-671, Buenos A res, Argentina, 
May 31 1948. Pp. 11 9 et sqq. 
E. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RJBLICATIONS 
Agticultural, Pastoral and Forest Industries in Argentina, 
Washington, D. C., United States Tariff Commission, -
1947. Pp. 26, 30, 34, 37, 38 et sqq. 
-128-
Argentine 1950-51 Grain Exlorts Reach Post-war Low, Washington, 
D. c., Office of Fore gn Agricultural RelatiOns, 
United States Dept, of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural 
Circular, August 24, 1951. p, 1. 
Foreign Connnerce weekly, Washington, D. C., United States 
, Dept. of Connnerce, September 7, 1946, p, 24 • 
.! i! ,, 11Foreign Service Report Series", Arfentine 1950 Economic 
Review, washington, D. c., uni ed states Dept. of 
COmt!lerce, Number 8 1 May, 1951. P. 1. 
' 
Moore, oscar K., Ar'fentine Farming and Farm Trade, 
Foreign Agricu tural Report NUmber 25, Office of 
Foreign Agricultural Relations, United States Dept. 
of Agriculture, Washington, D. c., Ju~e, 1948. 
Pp. 3, 5, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22. 
:: 
r! Recent Developments in the Forei~n Trade of Argentina, 
,: Washington, D. c., United s ates TarTI'f connnission, 
:r 1950, TC 1.22, Ar 3, Pp. 55, 64 1 67 1 68, 
'I i' The ·1~-- Economic Situation in Argentina, Washington, D. Int~national.Reference Service, United States 
of Commerce, 1944. P. 2. 
F. NEWSPAPERS 
c., 
Dept. 
['Argentina Libra (outlawed underground Argentine publication), 
jl May 17, 1949. 
,, 
;r New York Times, January 29, 1948 • . , __ _ 
:: ] New York Times 1 October 71 1951. , __ --- -=== 
1 ~ York Times, January 4, 1952. 
- ----- .:::.;·-:;-~_;:-===--= 
II 
~~cc="-"CC~c-t-~-cc_=c----~--" _ "" "--'~- ------ --
,, 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRAIUATE SCHOOL 
An Abstract of a Thesis 
THE DOWNWARD TREND OF ARGENTINE AGRICULTITRAL 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, 1946-51 
by 
:MARTIN H. SABLE 
(A.B., Boston University, 1946} 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
1952 
-:;-:-_-- ----·-----
' !I ,, 
-129-
- .... --- ---.,--_--~---· -: --_--
The purpose undertaken in this study was to show that 
there was a downward trend in the production and exports of 
Argentina agricultural commodities during the years 1946-51, 
which may be easily noted from the statistics in Table VIII 
(see page ). Table XIII (see page ), a comparison of 
the pre-war exports (1935-39) of agricultural commodities with 
those pertaining during 1946-51 will show the obvious downward 
trend in grain exports. 
Under normal pre-war conditions, when government inter-
il I vention meant only aid to the farmer--and not the control of 
: agricultural economy--such a downward trend. would be highly ~~ doubtful, if not impossible. Even when the depths of the Great 
,, 
" :: Depression were felt, agricultural production in pre-war years 
I! showed a definite upward trend over the years. 
II 
i! But taking into consideration the post-war financial 
ii 
conditions of Argentina, as well as the policies of the govern-
Ji ment operative since 19461 the results of the study quite 
I 
: clearly demonstrate that there was a downward trend in the 
r: 
production and exports of farm products in Argentina from 
1946-51. 
This study was begun by describing the size, location 
ii and natural fitness of Argentina for larc;e volume production 
II of quality farm products. Yet, instead of up, the trend has 
' 
I been down--and much of this can be traced directly to the 
-130-
The farmer is one of the most individualistic of 
'I 
',II 11 businessmen who labors under great difficulties and under ,, 
II 
i1, 
:j 
I' 
,I 
,, 
,, 
great uncertainties to gain his living. Thus, if his govern-
ment restricts his sales of his products and his just profits, 
he will retaliate in those ways left open to him. One means 
of retaliation for the farmer, as has been shown, was the 
I, voluntary reduction of acreage sown to leading crops. 
It is concluded that there are four reasons for the 
downward trend of Argentine agricultural production and 
exports during the period, 1946-51, with the fourth and last 
,, reason being the main one for the drop in production and 
li 
I' exports: 
II 
'i 1. The lure of better wages, working conditions and II ;: 
!i 
opportunities in the city, causing a scarcity of farm labor. 
2. Bad climatic conditions and locusts in several post-
li war 
1: 
crop years (a minor cause). 
', 3. Lack of mechanization of agriculture. Argentina 
~ : 
11 is badly in need of farm machinery, the lack of which is 
I, 
due directly to government policies. 
4. Negative government policies, whereby the government's 
purchasing and sales agency, IAPI, purchased farm products 
,: at little above the cost of production (thus providing little 
li 
I, incentive for larger sewings) and sold them on the inter-
'' ll national market at the highest possible prices. The vast 
I 
':profits reaped from the export sales of agricultural goods 
to begin the industrialization of Argentina, 
~- -- --~·-----::-=...--:::c==--=---=--:--=- - ---·----- -- -- - '- -::• - -- - -
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the mechanization of the Argentine army, and the rewarding 
of that segment of the populace to which President Peron 
owed his position: labor. Since agriculture is the basis 
' of the Argentine economy, Peron endangered the country's 
overall economy when he squeezed agriculture in order to 
benefit other sectors of the economic system. 
An indirect result of the last factor was seen in the 
shift of traditional purchasers of Argentine agricultural 
commodities to other sources of supply, due to the intolerably 
high prices charged by IAPI. 
The British, for example--traditional purchasers of 
Argentine quebracho (a necessary ingredient used in the tanning 
ii of leather and hides) --switched their purchases to wattle 
li 
: bark (a lower-priced substitute) from their African dependen-
cies. 
The logical policy which the Argentine Government should 
now pursue, in order to revitalize its weakened agricultural 
economy and restore Argentina to its former position of 
"breadbasket of the world", should include: 
1. The scrapping of IAPI as exporter of agricultural 
, commodities. 
2. The consequent return of foreien sales of farm 
, products to private hands, thus allowing the decontrol of 
!i 
::the agricultural economy to restore the export of farm 
i 
:; products to its normal position. 
3. Government aid to farming; to include: 
-132-
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;! 
a. Mechanization of farming, the Government 
i 
1.: 
aiding the purchase of machinery with liberal 
credit terms. 
II 
li 
II 
I' ji 
n 
b. Technical aids to the farmer, including hybrid-
ization, soil conservation, crop rotation, etc., 
so as to produce a larger yield of better quality 
with minimum labor. 
c. A system of Government subsidies, long-term 
financing, or both, in order to instill in the 
farmer the needed confidence so that he will 
voluntarily raise production of agricultural 
!i colllr.lodities. 
jl 
I ~ 
1', 
With such a broad program of government aid to the 
~~agricultural producer and worker under a free enterprise 
!I system {whereby the producer of farm commodities is able to 
i 
' 
:
1
sell his products to whomever he pleases, both at home and 
!Ia broad, and personally realize the just fruits of his labors), 
i: 
:.!the bes_t incentive is provided for the real increase in 
[!,agricultural production and exports. 
il 
' [I IAPI attempted to provide an incentive for an increase 
l,by sharing its profits with producers but this plan met with 
li
1
little success. The free domestic and export sale by the 
i 
i
1
11farmer of his own products would more than likely have resulted 
1~n increases which the Peron Government would. hardly have 
~elieved possible. 
I 
i' Every country depends on agriculture as the basis of its 
,· 
I; 
···=·r=··-
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rj economy, and Argentina--because its income is based mainly 
' 
I j! on agricultural exports--is doubly dependent on its agricul-
J1 ture. It thus behooves Argentina, more so than nations not 
lj so dependent on agriculture to maintain its overall national 
! economy in a healthy and prosperous condition, so that it may 
.I 
II develop as a leading member of the family of nations, a post 
I! for which nature has undoubtedly endowed it with outstanding 
ii ji natural resources to act as "breadbasket of the world". 
,I 
li In addition to many natural resources, which include 
II 
!I a wide variety of farm products, Argentina can boast a good 
1 geographical locat:!,on, and a basically European population 
II 
11 with commercial and industrial 11 know-how11 • These qualities 
li are requisite for Argentina 1 s development into a leading 
,. 
jj nation through which it could raise the living standard of 
the Argentine people as well as contribute to the welfare 
of the entire world. 
il 
J; Argentina Is development into a leading power can become 
'I 
li a reality only if the correct political policies are followed 
I' lr 
1; through by its political leaders, the basic one being the 
i 
:~bolstering of the agricultural economy, on which, in the 
'I 
il final analysis, the well-being and future of the Argentine 
lr 
" 
II nation depends. 
1! 
'I ;: 
r! 
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